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ARTICLES

CRIMINALIZING MATCH-FIXING AS
AMERICA LEGALIZES SPORTS GAMBLING
JODI S. BALSAM

INTRODUCTION1
In May 2018, the Supreme Court decided Murphy v. NCAA,2 striking down
the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA) that prohibited
states from allowing sports betting.3 At this writing, more than two years after
PASPA’s judicial repeal, eighteen states have enacted legal sports betting, five
states plus Washington, D.C. have passed legislation that is pending launch, and
twenty-four more have introduced sports gambling bills. 4 Somewhat
myopically, these legislative efforts fail to address the game integrity concerns
flagged by the sports leagues and other entities that create the contests on which

 Associate Professor of Clinical Law, Director of Externship Programs, Brooklyn Law School. I received
excellent research assistance from Nick Rybarczyk, Matthew Schechter, Madison Smiley, and Katherine
Wilcox. Thank you to Daniel Wallach and to participants in the Brooklyn Law School Faculty Workshop for
their time and helpful comments and suggestions. I also benefited enormously in writing this article from my
experience as in-house counsel at the National Football League from 1994 through 2006, but all opinions
expressed herein are entirely my own.
1
This article builds on my prior scholarship examining the history of American match-fixing scandals;
how leagues and law enforcement have attempted to deter, detect, and punish the malefactors; and how with
the onset of legal sports betting state governments have missed the opportunity to regulate for game integrity.
Jodi S. Balsam, Legislating for Game Integrity as U.S. States Legalize Sports Betting, LAWINSPORT 4–6 (Sept.
6, 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3455424.
2
138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018).
3
28 U.S.C. §§ 3701–3704 (2020).
4
See Ryan Rodenberg, United States of Sports Betting: An Updated Map of Where Every State Stands,
ESPN (June 9, 2020), https://www.espn.com/chalk/story/_/id/19740480/the-united-states-sports-bettingwhere-all-50-states-stand-legalization; see also Dustin Gouker, Legislative Tracker: Sports Betting, LEGAL
SPORTS REP., https://www.legalsportsreport.com/sportsbetting-bill-tracker/(last visited Dec. 12, 2020).
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bets are being placed.5 Little attention is paid to the increased risk of matchfixing and in-play manipulation associated with expanded sports betting.
In particular, the enacted and proposed legislation introduce virtually no new
criminal penalties in the event of betting-related manipulation of the underlying
athletic competitions. To the extent sports gambling bills authorize new criminal
offenses, almost all solely penalize failure to comply with licensure and betting
integrity provisions, and do not define offenses relating to the integrity of
sports.6 Instead, the new laws implicitly rely on general penal code provisions
to deter and punish the fraudsters and criminals who will seek to exploit the
normalization of sports betting.7 Furthermore, where existing state laws address
sports corruption, they principally target sports bribery under penal code
analogues to the federal Sports Bribery Act, which makes it a felony to
“influence . . . by bribery any sporting contest.”8 Such provisions do not cover
non-bribery situations where other means are used to corrupt athletic contests,
such as extortion, blackmail, and duress.9 Nor does the sports bribery offense
address tipping of confidential information or betting on games by a sports
participant who has the ability to affect outcomes.10 These lacunae create real
vulnerability in globalized betting markets that provide increasingly fertile
ground for corrupt actors.11
Part II of this article offers an understanding of the moral and legal
dimensions of honest athletic competition and the importance of defining game
manipulation as a crime. Part III describes the American experience with sports
5
In his 1992 testimony before Congress in support of PASPA, then NFL Commissioner Paul Tagliabue
testified: “[S]ports gambling threatens the integrity of, and public confidence in, team sports. Sports lotteries
inevitably foster a climate of suspicion about controversial plays and intensify cynicism with respect to player
performances, coaching decisions, officiating calls and game results.” Prohibiting State-Sanctioned Sports
Gambling: Hearing on S. 473 and S. 474 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 25 (1992) [hereinafter S. 473 and S. 474 Hearing]; see also discussion
infra Part IV.
6
See John T. Holden, Prohibitive Failure: The Demise of the Ban on Sports Betting, 35 GA. ST. U. L. REV.
329, 379–80 (2019) (identifying “two layers of integrity issues” in legal sports gambling: integrity of
sportsbooks and of the underlying sports events). A notable exception is West Virginia. See W. VA. CODE §
29-22D-21(b)(1) (2018) (making it a felony to bribe someone for the purpose of influencing the outcome of
an athletic contest, or to tip inside information relevant to a sports wager).
7
See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12A-11(c) (West 2018) (defining a single new criminal offense of operating
a sports pool without a license, and imposing modest fines for “disorderly conduct” when sports insiders bet
on their own games).
8
18 U.S.C.A. § 224 (West 1994), commonly referred to as the Sports Bribery Act. Forty-six states and
the District of Columbia have enacted a similar prohibition. See infra notes 133–36 and accompanying text.
9
See John T. Holden & Ryan M. Rodenberg, The Sports Bribery Act: A Law and Economics Approach,
42 N. KY. L. REV. 453, 454, 465 (2015); Holden, supra note 6, at 341; Kelly Hudson & Rod Findley,
Corruption: Agreeing to Match-Fixing Under Duress: Analysis, WORLD SPORTS L. REP. 8(6) (June 2010);
see also discussion infra Part IV.
10
See John T. Holden & Ryan M. Rodenberg, Lone-Wolf Match-Fixing: Global Policy Considerations, 9
INT’L J. SPORT POL’Y & POL. 137, 138 (2017).
11
See Kevin Carpenter, Why Are Countries Taking So Long to Act on Match-Fixing?, TRANSPARENCY
INT’L,https://www.transparency.org/files/content/feature/Feature_TakingLongMatchFixing_Carpenter_GCR
Sport.pdf (last visited July 31, 2020).
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gambling, the common types of sports bets, and how they correlate to game
manipulation risks. Part IV critiques existing penal provisions addressed to
corruption in sports and the failure of post-Murphy sports betting legislation to
address gaps in those provisions. Part V examines the European experience with
match-fixing and growing acknowledgment of the necessity of defining criminal
offenses specific to sports corruption. Building on that experience, it proposes a
federal penal provision that makes competition manipulation a separate criminal
offense, rather than relying on existing general provisions incriminating fraud,
bribery, corruption, or deception. The article concludes with recommendations
for a public-private collaboration to safeguard sport integrity.
I. HONEST ATHLETIC COMPETITION AND ITS MANIPULATION AS A CRIME
In ordinary usage, sports integrity means playing the game according to the
rules, resulting in “fair and honest performances and outcomes, unaffected by
illegitimate enhancements or external interests.”12 While sports integrity has
both on-field and off-field components,13 this article focuses on the former and
specifically the manipulation of how the athletic contest is played.14 To preserve
the multibillion-dollar sports industry and its role in American society, it is
essential for the public to believe in the integrity of the games or events—“that
the outcome of a sporting competition is genuine.”15
A key characteristic of on-field integrity is outcome uncertainty—
“competitive sport is supposedly unscripted, leaving open the possibility of an

12
National
Integrity
of
Sport
Unit,
AUSTL.
GOV’T
DEP’T
OF
HEALTH,
https://www.health.gov.au/internet/main/publishing.nsf/content/national-integrity-of-sport-unit (Aug. 3,
2016); Michelle Minton, Legalizing Sports Betting in the United States, COMPETITIVE ENTER. INST. (Mar. 15,
2018), https://cei.org/content/legalizing-sports-betting-united-states (“The integrity of sports depends on the
outcome of any given match being the result of fair play on the field”); Int’l Olympic Comm., Code of Ethics,
art. 10 (2018) (stating participants must not “manipulate the course or result of a competition, or any part
thereof, in a manner contrary to sporting ethics, infringe the principle of fair play or show unsporting
conduct”); SORBONNE–ICSS INTEGRITY REP., PROTECTING THE INTEGRITY OF SPORT COMPETITION: THE
LAST BET FOR MODERN SPORT 36 (2012–14), http://theicss.org/2019/02/20/protecting-the-integrity-of-sportcompetition-the-last-bet-for-modern-sport/ [hereinafter SORBONNE-ICSS REP.].
13
Matthew J. Mitten, How Is the Integrity of Sport Protected in the United States?, 19 TEX. REV. ENT. &
SPORTS L. 89, 90 n.4 (2019). The designation “on-field” and “off-field” is meant generically, to describe the
location of any athletic competition, including those that take place on court, ice, track, gym mat, or water.
Off-field integrity encompasses expectations of good and honest sports governance and protection of athletes
from discrimination, harassment, and abuse. See, e.g., Adam Epstein & Barbara Osborne, Teaching Ethics
with Sports: Recent Developments, 28 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 301, 309, 343 (2018).
14
In addition to competition manipulation, the two other leading methods of disrupting on-field integrity
are illegal performance enhancement, e.g., doping, and sabotage or cheating, e.g., injuring a competitor or
spying on opponents. See ANTHONY CABOT & KEITH MILLER, SPORTS WAGERING IN AMERICA: POLICIES,
ECONOMICS, AND REGULATION 117 (2018).
15
Richard H. McLaren, Corruption: Its Impact on Fair Play, 19 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 15, 15 (2008);
CABOT ET AL., supra note 14, at 108; Holden, supra note 6, at 380 (observing “both leagues and sportsbooks
have an interest in protecting the integrity of the underlying sporting events from corruptors”).
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unexpected outcome.”16 The very legitimacy of the sport product and its appeal
to fans depends on this unpredictability and authenticity.17 Authenticity in turn
requires that all game participants use their best efforts.18 Accordingly,
competition manipulation has been defined as: “an intentional arrangement, act
or omission aimed at improper alteration of the result or the course of a sports
competition in order to remove all or part of the unpredictable nature of the
aforementioned sports competition with a view to obtaining an undue advantage
for oneself or for others.”19
A competition “fix” may be motivated by financial gain, e.g., enabling a
winning bet, or by sporting advantage, e.g., manipulating to affect seeding in a
tournament or to guarantee advancement.20 Either way, this behavior constitutes
a “cultural crime” in that society loses when sports corruption is exposed and
the values associated with sport are exposed as a “sham.”21
Manipulation of sport can also constitute a legal crime when it imposes
tangible injury on real victims, namely the sport’s governing body, and its fans,
sponsors, related industries, and non-complicit participants.22 Fixing deprives
ticket holders and other spectators of the outcome uncertainty that comprises the
16
Holden et al., supra note 8, at 454, 461; Marc Edelman, Regulating Sports Gambling in the Aftermath of
Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, 26 GEO. MASON L. REV. 313, 316 (2018) (“[F]ans [must]
believe[] game results were the product of bona fide competition and not a predetermined script”).
17
See McLaren, supra note 14, at 16 (observing that “[i]ntegrity in sport is crucial to its success and to the
enjoyment of participants and spectators” and that “[o]nce lost it is very difficult to ever retrieve”).
18
AUSTL. DEP’T OF HEALTH, NATIONAL POLICY ON MATCH-FIXING IN SPORT (June 10, 2011),
https://www1.health.gov.au/internet/main/publishing.nsf/Content/687CADCF3C1BEF8ACA257C310021C
D5C/$File/national_policy_match-fixing.pdf (in the “context” section, defining manipulation to include,
among other things, “deliberate under-performance,” “withdrawal (tanking),” and “an official’s deliberate
misapplication of the rules of the contest”).
19
COUNCIL OF EUR., COUNCIL OF EUROPE CONVENTION ON THE MANIPULATION OF SPORTS
COMPETITIONS 3 (2014), https://rm.coe.int/16801cdd7e [hereinafter “Macolin Convention”]. More to the
point, match-fixing occurs when contestants are “willing to reduce their effort contribution for specific
matches if the rewards for doing so are large enough” for example because gambling provides “an opportunity
to generate returns on the insider information.” Ian Preston & Stefan Szymanski, Cheating in Contests, 19
OXFORD REV. OF ECON. POL’Y 612 (2003).
20
INT’L OLYMPIC COMM., HANDBOOK ON PROTECTING SPORT FROM COMPETITION MANIPULATION 19
(2016),https://stillmed.olympic.org/media/Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/IOC/What-WeDo/Protecting-Clean-Athletes/Betting/Education-Awareness-raising/Interpol-IOC-Handbook-on-ProtectingSport-from-Competition-Manipulation.pdf [hereinafter INTERPOL-IOC HANDBOOK]. Interpol is the
international criminal police organization that works with its 194 member countries to fight international
crime. See, e.g., Epstein & Osborne, supra note 13, at 341 (describing intentional “tanking” in Olympic
badminton to manipulate tournament brackets); CABOT ET AL., supra note 14, at 131 (describing tanking by
NBA teams to reach a better position to draft future players).
21
See DAVID FORREST, SPORTS BETTING: LAW AND POLICY 14, 16 (Paul M. Anderson et al. eds., 2011).
22
CABOT ET AL., supra note 14, at 137–38; COUNCIL OF EUR., EXPLANATORY REPORT TO THE COUNCIL
OF EUROPE CONVENTION ON THE MANIPULATION OF SPORTS COMPETITIONS 21 (2014) (identifying victims
of competition manipulation to include “other persons having placed bets, the opposing team, or, where
applicable, the national or international federation responsible for organising [sic] the competition”),
https://rm.coe.int/16800d383f [hereinafter COUNCIL OF EUR. EXPLANATORY REP.]; see generally Paul
Gaffney, Playing with Cheaters, 63 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 197, 208–09 (2018-2019) (observing that when a
teammate corrupts the game, honest athletes are harmed by, among other things, assumed complicity, damage
to team morale, and whistleblowing risks).
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event’s main attraction. Revenues from broadcasting, sponsorship, and
licensing will decline if sports corruption disillusions and alienates consumers.23
Sports governing bodies will need to expend resources on detection and
enforcement of honest play rules. Given these quantifiable injuries (and others),
gambling-related manipulation of sport resembles various types of property and
financial crimes.24
To be fair, the risk of gambling-related corruption is present whether sports
wagering is legal or not. 25 Indeed, many argue that legalized and regulated sports
gambling offers advantages in protecting game integrity because it brings
transparency and oversight.26 Especially in the digital era, taking gambling out
of the black market provides access to data to track customers’ activity and
identify betting anomalies that suggest possible corruption.27 The question
remains, once a fixer is caught, what criminal laws are necessary to facilitate
prosecution of the sport integrity violation, impose punishment, and thereby
deter future corruption?28 To draft those criminal laws, a necessary step is to
understand the underlying conduct,29 namely, common types of sports bets and
the game manipulation risks associated with different types of bets.
II. COMMON SPORTS BETS AND GAME-MANIPULATION RISK FACTORS
Americans have been betting on sports since the earliest days of
horseracing.30 With the founding of the first professional baseball leagues in the
1870s, betting became an “integral part of the game,” including bets on the
game’s outcome and also on events during the game, such as whether the next

23

CABOT ET AL., supra note 14, at 138.
See FORREST, supra note 21. A related form of sports corruption is “insider trading” on confidential,
competitively sensitive information (e.g., player injuries) to defraud the betting markets. See Ryan Grandeau,
Securing the Best Odds: Why Congress Should Regulate Sports Gambling Based on Securities-Style
Mandatory Disclosure, 41 CARDOZO L. REV. 1229, 1254, 1259–60 (2020) (recommending mandatory
disclosure requirements for sports leagues and teams to counter “the threat of illicitly-gained informational
asymmetries”). While this article focuses on corruption of the athletic competition, not the betting markets, it
should be acknowledged that solicitation of inside information to gain a betting advantage can lead to matchfixing when insiders are game participants whose breach of confidentiality rules exposes them to pressure to
corrupt the match.
25
See Stephen F. Ross et al., Reform of Sports Gambling in the United States: Lessons from Down Under,
5 ARIZ. ST. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 6, 8, 11–13 (2015).
26
See, e.g., id. at 9; DAVID FORREST & RICK PARRY, THE KEYS TO SPORTS INTEGRITY IN THE UNITED
STATES: LEGALIZED, REGULATED SPORTS BETTING 2-3, 15 (2016).
27
See Justin Fielkow et al., Tackling PASPA: The Past, Present, and Future of Sports Gambling in
America, 66 DEPAUL L. REV. 23, 47 (2016); Todd Dewey, Las Vegas Bookmakers Know a Fix When They
See One, L.V. REV.-J. (Sept. 8, 2017), https://www.reviewjournal.com/sports/betting/las-vegas-bookmakersknow-a-fix-when-they-see-one/ (reporting on Las Vegas bookmakers tipping law enforcement as to suspected
point-shaving in by Arizona State University basketball players).
28
CABOT ET AL., supra note 14, at 146–47.
29
Paul H. Robinson & Markus D. Dubber, The American Model Penal Code: A Brief Overview, 10 NEW
CRIM. L. REV. 319, 331 (2007).
30
ARNE K. LANG, SPORTS BETTING AND BOOKMAKING: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 37-38 (2016).
24
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pitch would be a ball or a strike or whether a batter would score.31 By the early
twentieth century, scandals involving state-run revenue lotteries resulted in bans
on all forms of gambling in most states.32 Nonetheless, illegal sports betting
persisted, including the most notorious episode of betting-related matchfixing—the crooked 1919 World Series.33
Economic necessity in the mid-twentieth century brought a resurgence of
legalized gambling as a way to replenish state coffers, with Nevada as the first
state to sponsor casino gambling (in 1931) and betting on sports (in 1949).34
Sports betting—both legal and illegal—picked up steam over the next few
decades with three developments: the invention of the point-spread, the advent
of televised sports, and the reduction of the federal tax on legal sports bets.35 By
the mid-1970s, sports betting came into its own; Nevada reported almost $900
million in sports bets in 1984, the first year that number was tracked.36 For 2017,
that number had increased by 440% to $4.9 billion bets placed (the “handle”) in
Nevada sportsbooks.37 Illegal U.S. sports wagering for that same year, just prior
to the invalidation of PASPA, has been estimated at between $67 and $150
billion.38
The simplest type of sports wager is the “straight bet”—an individual wager
on a game or event that will be determined by the “money line” or the “point
spread.”39 A straight bet on the money line is a wager on the odds of a team
winning a game outright, and is more common in low scoring events like
baseball or hockey and in individual sports. So, a sportsbook might offer 5/1
odds that Major League Baseball’s Chicago Cubs will win its next game against
the Pittsburgh Pirates, or that Simona Halep will defeat Serena Williams in the
Wimbledon finals.40 The money line is also used in betting on future events such
as whether a particular team will win the season championship. For example, a
31
RICHARD O. DAVIES & RICHARD G. ABRAM, BETTING THE LINE: SPORTS WAGERING IN AMERICAN LIFE
19 (2001).
32
ROGER DUNSTAN, GAMBLING IN CALIFORNIA: HISTORY OF GAMBLING IN THE UNITED STATES, CAL.
RES. BUREAU: CAL. ST. LIBR. CRB-97-003, II-7 (1997),
https://www.library.ca.gov/Content/pdf/crb/reports/97-003.pdf.
33
See EDWARD J. LORDAN, SPORTS AND SCANDALS: HOW LEAGUES PROTECT THE INTEGRITY OF THEIR
GAMES 20-27 (2014) (describing how eight members of the Chicago White Sox accepted bribes from
gamblers to throw the World Series).
34
See DUNSTAN, supra note 32, at II-8; Edelman, supra note 16, at 317.
35
Barbara Mantel, Betting on Sports, 26 CQ RESEARCHER 891, 900 (Oct. 28, 2016).
36
See CABOT ET AL., supra note 14, at 56; A Look Inside the Numbers of Sports Betting in the U.S. and Overseas,
SPORTS BUS. J. (Apr. 16, 2018), https://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2018/04/16/World-Congress-ofSports/Research.aspx.
37
A Look Inside the Numbers of Sports Betting in the U.S. and Overseas, supra note 36.
38
Jay L. Zagorsky, Market for Illegal Sports Betting in US Is Not Really a $150 Billion Business, THE
CONVERSATION (May 14, 2018), https://theconversation.com/market-for-illegal-sports-betting-in-us-is-notreally-a-150-billion-business-96618.
39
CABOT ET AL., supra note 14, at 5–17. The European betting markets more often use the term “handicap”
to refer to the point spread.
40
See id. at 5–7.
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sportsbook might offer 60/1 odds that the National Football League’s New York
Jets will win the next Super Bowl.41
Bettors also wager on the point spread, which represents the margin of points
by which the favored team must win to “cover the spread.” For example, in a
game between the NBA’s Golden State Warriors and New York Knicks, the
point spread might be the Warriors by eight points. A bettor who wagered on
the Warriors would win that bet if the team won by at least nine points, for
example, by a score of 100-91.42 A variation on a point-spread bet is an
“over/under” bet, in which the bettor wagers that the combined point total of
two teams will be more than a specified total, without necessarily specifying a
winner. In the Warriors-Knicks example, a bettor who wagered that the total
game score would exceed 200 points would lose that bet. Point-spread and
over/under betting are referred to as “binary betting formulas” because they
allow a dissociation between the sporting result and the betting result.43
Proposition or “prop” bets are wagers on aspects of a game besides the final
score or outcome. These have become more popular lately, although they date
back to at least since the early days of professional baseball, as noted above.44
For example, in American football, common prop bets include which team will
incur most penalty yards, which team will kick the first field goal, or whether a
running back will rush for a certain number of yards.
In the digital age “in-game” wagering has proliferated—with bettors on-site
and off-site using electronic means to place bets in real-time while the game is
happening.45 In-game wagers can be made on propositions or outcomes. For
example, an in-game bettor might wager on whether the next football play will
be a run or a pass or whether the next basketball possession will result in a
score.46 In-game bets can also be made on a shifting money line that reflects
changes in the odds since the contest started, for example, because the favorite
is losing. In-game wagering has been a key driver of online sports betting
revenues in recent years.47 Gamblers often use these bets to hedge against
anticipated losses on straight bets or bets made before the event started.48

41

See id. at 22–23.
See id. at 10–13. If the margin of victory is exactly the point-spread, the bet is a “push” and the bookie
simply reimburses the wager amount.
43
SORBONNE-ICSS REPORT, supra note 12, at 27.
44
Proposition bets are also referred to as novelty or spot bets.
45
See CABOT ET AL., supra note 14, at 22. This type of bet is sometimes referred to as “in-play” betting or
“live betting.” See INTERPOL-IOC HANDBOOK, supra note 20, at 35.
46
CABOT ET AL., supra note 14, at 162.
47
See BEN VAN ROMPUY, THE ODDS OF MATCH FIXING: FACTS & FIGURES ON THE INTEGRITY RISK OF
CERTAIN SPORTS BETS 5 (2015), https://www.asser.nl/media/2623/the-odds-of-matchfixing-report-2015.pdf
[hereinafter ASSER INST. MATCH FIXING FACTS & FIGURES] (reporting that in-game bets were estimated to
account for more than 70% of all European sports bets placed online).
48
Should You Use Live Betting to Hedge Bets?, LIVEBETTING.NET, https://www.livebetting.net/strategy/hedging/
(last visited July 31, 2020).
42
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Of these categories of wagers, sports fixers are attracted to betting markets
with high liquidity (a large handle) because those markets operate most
efficiently, with the lowest prices, most stable money lines, and largest choice
of wagers.49 In such markets, large bets are more acceptable, and pay-outs more
predictable, maximizing the profits from organizing a fix.50 Most importantly,
high liquidity means a fixer’s bet will be less conspicuous, minimizing the risk
of detection by law enforcement or a sport’s governing body. 51 At present, the
highest liquidity resides in the markets for more conventional straight bets.
Empirical data from European football (soccer) shows that betting-related match
fixing is predominantly associated with the final score of a game and in
particular with total goals scored by each team.52
Within the category of straight bets, the risk of corruption escalates with
binary betting formulas, that is when the sporting result is separate from the
betting result.53 With point-spread and over/under bets, the cost of the fraud is
lower. The fix does not require arranging for someone to intentionally lose a
game, but only to manipulate the margin of victory.54 Often that can be
accomplished by a single player, even in team sports. In individual sports like
tennis, such fraud is rampant.55 By contrast, the fix is far costlier for a money
line straight bet, where the fixer has to induce one or more individuals to
intentionally lose the game, which increases the risk of failure and detection.56
Accordingly, most instances of game manipulation in the U.S. have involved
a team attempting to win by less than the betting point-spread, a method known
as “point-shaving.”57 Statistical evidence points to the likelihood of widespread
point-shaving in NCAA college basketball, but “the crime is almost
imperceptible” and is rarely prosecuted.58 A referee can also affect the pointspread through how he officiates the game, as suggested (but not proven) in the

49

See FORREST, supra note 21.
CABOT ET AL., supra note 14, at 140; FORREST, supra note 21.
51
CABOT ET AL., supra note 14, at 138.
52
See ASSER INST. MATCH FIXING FACTS & FIGURES, supra note 47, at 33. For clarity and convenience
going forward, “football” refers to the American game, and “soccer” refers to the international game.
53
See SORBONNE-ICSS REP., supra note 12, at 27.
54
See ASSER INST. MATCH FIXING FACTS & FIGURES, supra note 47, at 34.
55
ADAM LEWIS ET AL., FINAL REPORT - INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF INTEGRITY IN TENNIS 2 (2018)
[hereinafter “TENNIS INTEGRITY REP.”] (reporting a “tsunami” of betting-related breaches of integrity).
56
See CABOT ET AL., supra note 14, at 135; SORBONNE-ICSS REPORT, supra note 12, at 27; ASSER INST.,
CTR. FOR EUR. AND INT’L L., STUDY ON RISK ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT AND PREVENTION OF
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN THE PREVENTION AND FIGHT AGAINST BETTING -RELATING MATCH FIXING IN THE
EU 28, FINAL REPORT 13 (July 2014) [hereinafter ASSER INST. EU 28 STUDY].
57
See Holden et al., supra note 9, at 461.
58
See Shaun Assael, Portrait of a Point Shaver, ESPN (Mar. 6, 2014), https://www.espn.com/menscollege-basketball/story/_/id/10545391/former-assistant-tj-brown-brandon-johnson-center-university-sandiego-point-shaving-scandal-espn-magazine (analyzing over 35,000 NCAA games and identifying anomalies
in teams failing to cover the point spread); see Balsam, supra note 1, at 4–6.
50
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NBA-Tim Donaghy betting scandal.59 This risk is especially salient in sports
like basketball where the referee’s decision to call a foul can directly result in a
scoring opportunity for one team.
With the dramatic increase in prop bets and in-game wagering, concern has
arisen about “spot fixing”—when a player seeks to manipulate a specific event
in an athletic contest to allow the fixer to win a proposition or an in-game bet.60
At the moment, empirical support is lacking for the assertion that prop bets pose
significant risk of game manipulation.61 In the more mature European betting
markets, criminal elements have not demonstrated interest in exploiting prop
bets because of low liquidity and restrictions on the size of bets.62 But the risk
cannot be discarded given that it takes only one individual to affect an in-game
event (e.g., a baseball pitcher intentionally throwing a ball or strike).63 When
prop bets are made on insignificant events within a game, manipulation is
extremely difficult to detect.64 And because spot fixing usually has a small or
no impact on the outcome of the game, athletes may discount the ethical,
criminal, and sporting transgression.65
In-game wagering poses distinct risks of game manipulation because fixers
can maximize profits by virtue of the higher betting limits and variations in the
odds.66 Some countries have banned in-game bets because they believe it is
more vulnerable to match fixing and corruption is harder to detect, given the
short period between the placing of bets and the event being bet on.67 But again,
because of the low liquidity of in-game betting markets at present, limited
evidence exists that the risks are greater than those associated with pre-event
betting.68
Finally, apart from the type of bet, certain categories of athletic competitions
are more susceptible to manipulation, especially when little is at stake in terms
of sports glory.69 Thus, the Council of Europe in its report on manipulation of
sports competitions, recommends nations prohibit betting on youth
59
United States v. Donaghy, 2007 WL 4189121 ¶¶ 9–13 (E.D.N.Y.); 18 U.S.C. § 1346. See discussion
infra Part III.A of this betting scandal and prosecution.
60
See INTERPOL-IOC HANDBOOK, supra note 20, at 39; CABOT ET AL., supra note 14, at 128.
61
See ASSER INST. MATCH FIXING FACTS & FIGURES, supra note 47, at 34.
62
See id. A small number of spot fixing instances have been documented, see, e.g., Football Legend
Matthew Le Tissier Admits His Part in Attempted £10,000 Betting Scam, DAILY MAIL REP. (Sept. 3, 2009),
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1210882/Football-legend-Matthew-Le-Tissier-admits-10-000Premier-League-betting-scam.html.
63
See CABOT ET AL., supra note 14, at 128.
64
See Holden et al., supra note 9, at 461; ASSER INST. MATCH FIXING FACTS & FIGURES, supra note 47,
at 5-6; INTERPOL-IOC HANDBOOK, supra note 20, at 39.
65
See ASSER INST. MATCH FIXING FACTS & FIGURES, supra note 47, at 5.
66
See id.; SORBONNE-ICSS REP., supra note 12, at 27.
67
See ASSER INST.EU 28 STUDY, supra note 56, at 13 (identifying Germany and Austria).
68
See U.K. Gambling Comm., In-play (in-running) Betting: Position Paper 5 (Sept. 2016),
https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/PDF/In-running-betting-position-paper.pdf;
SORBONNE-ICSS
REPORT, supra note 12, at 81.
69
See ASSER INST. MATCH FIXING FACTS & FIGURES, supra note 47, at 6.
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competitions, friendly matches, and matches in lower leagues.70 For example,
independent review of the integrity of professional tennis, which has identified
epidemic match-fixing, reported that corruption is most prevalent among young
players in the lower levels of the sport.71
In sum, developing technology and new wager categories place any game, at
any level, anywhere in the world, within the scope of global betting markets.
Globalization also means that corrupt actors are able to distribute the risk of
detection by placing bets in different geographic locations from where games
are being played. When “anyone can have a personal and direct financial interest
in the course or outcome of any given competition,” it is no surprise that the
global sports industry has experienced a significant increase in game
manipulation over the last twenty years.72 But more than sport integrity is at
stake, according to the Council of Europe: “The manipulation of sports
competitions poses a challenge to the rule of law because it is linked to fraud,
organised [sic] crime and corruption.”73
III. THE PENAL CODE LACUNAE IN U.S. LEGAL SPORTS BETTING REGIMES
As the U.S. joins global sports betting markets, it too becomes “ripe for
would-be match-fixers.”74 Rule of law concerns are just as salient, behooving
that federal and state governments enact “basic criminal code provisions”
regarding competition manipulation and to prioritize detection and prosecution
of sports corruption.75 That advice has yet to be taken in post-Murphy America.
A. Existing Federal Criminal Laws Inadequately Target Match-Fixing
With the invalidation of PASPA, a single federal penal provision targets the
manipulation of athletic competition—the Sports Bribery Act.76 The Act had its
origins in a series of college basketball match-fixing scandals in the 1940s, 50s
70

COUNCIL OF EUR. EXPLANATORY REP., supra note 22, at 6.
See TENNIS INTEGRITY REP., supra note 55, at 13. During the 2020 Covid-19 pandemic, match-fixers quickly
adapted to the shutdown of major league sports by “targeting lower-tier games and youth games that could provide data
for the betting markets.” UEFA Issues Match Fixing Warning as Fixers Adapt to Covid-19 Restrictions, INSIDE WORLD
FOOTBALL (Apr. 6, 2020), http://www.insideworldfootball.com/2020/04/06/uefa-issues-match-fixing-warning-fixersadapt-covid-19-restrictions/.
72
COUNCIL OF EUR. EXPLANATORY REP., supra note 22, at 1.
73
Id. at 2.
74
See Holden et al., supra note 9, at 466; see also Match-Fixing & Corruption in Sport—An Historical
Timeline, THE STATS ZONE (Mar. 3, 2016), https://www.thestatszone.com/archive/match-fixing-corruptionhistorical-timeline-14094 (listing episodes of match-fixing since 2000 across soccer, tennis, cricket, horseracing, boxing, basketball, football, and snooker and observing “it would be naïve to think [match-fixing]
does not exist somehow in every sport”); Steve Keating, Match-Fixing Not Doping Poses Greatest Risk to
Sport, REUTERS (Apr. 25, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sport-matchfixing/match-fixing-notdoping-poses-greatest-risk-to-sport-idUSKCN1S12UR.
75
CABOT ET AL., supra note 14, at 146.
76
18 U.S.C. § 224, commonly referred to as the Sports Bribery Act.
71
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and 60s, in which gamblers bribed student-athletes to shave points.77 The Act
prohibits “any scheme in commerce to influence, in any way, by bribery any
sporting contest, with knowledge that the purpose of such scheme is to influence
by bribery that contest.”78 “[S]porting contest” is further defined as “any contest
in any sport, between individual contestants or teams of contestants (without
regard to the amateur or professional status of the contestants therein), the
occurrence of which is publicly announced before its occurrence.”79
To the extent other federal statutes target sports gambling-related behaviors
and activities, they focus on illegal betting or the integrity of legal betting.80 For
example, the Interstate Wire Act criminalizes cross-border wire
communications that transmit “bets or wagers or information assisting in the
placing of bets or wagers on any sporting event or contest.” 81 The Travel Act
prohibits use of the mail and other methods to send illegal gambling materials
or make an illegal bet.82 The Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act
criminalizes the transfer of funds between a financial institution and an internet
gambling website.83 And of course the government has used the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) since its 1970 enactment to
combat organized crime by attacking activities like gambling, which can include
sportsbooks.84
Despite these tools to combat sports betting-related corruption, federal
enforcement efforts have been anemic.85 In over fifty-five years, the Sports
Bribery Act has generated only eighteen publicized prosecutions: eight
involving college athletics,86 seven involving horse-racing, two involving
professional boxing, and one involving ice dancing at the 2002 Winter
77

Holden et al., supra note 9, at 456.
18 U.S.C. § 224(a).
79
18 U.S.C. § 224(c)(2).
80
See generally Holden, supra note 6, 380 (identifying “two layers of integrity issues” in legal sports
gambling: integrity of sportsbooks and of the underlying sports events).
81
Interstate Wire Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (2020).
82
Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952.
83
Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act, 31 U.S.C. § 5361, et seq.; see also Illegal Gambling
Business Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (prohibiting operating an illegal gambling business).
84
18 U.S.C. § 1962; see United States v. Zizzo, 120 F.3d 1338, 1346 (7th Cir. 1997).
85
BO J. BERNHARD ET AL., PROFESSIONAL TEAM SPORTS IN LAS VEGAS: WHAT THE RESEARCH SAYS 31
(Feb. 1, 2015) (“the enforcement of gambling laws is exceedingly rare—and becoming even more rare—in
the
United
States”),
https://www.unlv.edu/sites/default/files/page_files/27/IGI-PublishedResearchNFLStudy.pdf; see Memorandum Opinion for the Acting Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division,
Reconsidering Whether the Wire Act Applies to Non-Sports Gambling, 42 OP. O.L.C 4-5 (Nov. 2, 2018)
(citing to the handful of prosecutions under the Wire Act); Jennifer Roberts & Greg Gemignani, Who Wore It
Better? Federal v. State Government Regulation of Sports Betting, 9 UNLV GAMING L.J. 77, 89 n.4 (2019).
86
See Balsam, supra note 1, at 4-6 (describing prosecutions of point-shaving in college basketball). The
number of Sports Bribery Act prosecutions involving college athletics increased from seven to eight in late
2019, when the U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of New York indicted mob members for attempting to
fix an NCAA game. See Indictment, United States v. Bifalco, No. 19-CR-444 (ARR) (E.D.N.Y. 2019),
https://www.justice.gov/usao-edny/pr/20-defendants-charged-crimes-including-racketeering-extortionloansharking.
78
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Olympics.87 Only six other reported decisions discuss the Act in any substantive
way.88 No prosecution under the Act has involved professional sporting contests
in the major U.S. team sports or individual sports like golf or tennis.89
Significantly, the Sports Bribery Act does not cover situations where means
other than bribery are used to manipulate athletic contests, such as extortion,
blackmail, and duress.90 In the notorious Boston College point-shaving incident,
immortalized in the film Goodfellas, the mobster/informant Henry Hill reported
that when the college players resisted bribes, he threatened to break their
fingers.91 Nor does the Act reach “lone-wolf” betting on games by a sports
participant who has the ability to affect outcomes.92
Thus, a prosecutor would be hard-pressed to fit into the federal Sports
Bribery Act any of the following scenarios:
•

•

A college basketball player bets on professional and college
football games in violation of the NCAA’s absolute ban on
sports wagering by its athletes. He is caught and the
university imposes the maximum penalty for a first
offense—a six-game suspension. The student-athlete
nonetheless continues to gamble until he is heavily in debt,
at which point his bookie threatens to expose him. To avoid
scandal and further NCAA discipline or ineligibility, the
athlete agrees to a point-shaving scheme.93
A minor league baseball player is befriended by gamblers
who pick up restaurant tabs, lend him a car, and introduce
him to young women. He wakes up groggy after joining

87
See Holden et al., supra note 9, at 457–58, citing U.S. v. Donaway, 447 F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 1971); U.S.
v. Pinto, 503 F.3d 718 (2d Cir. 1974); U.S. v. Turcotte, 515 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1975); U.S. v. DiNapoli, 557
F.2d 962 (2d Cir. 1975); U.S. v. Gerry, 515 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1975); U.S. v. Walsh, 554 F.2d 156 (4th Cir.
1976); U.S. v. Winter, 22 F.3d 15 (1st Cir. 1994).
88
See Winter, 22 F.3d at 15; Pinto, 503 F.2d at 720; In re Vericker, 446 F.2d 244 (2d Cir. 1971); Colbert
v Indiana Gaming Commn./Athletic Div., Civ. Action No. 11 2102, 2011 WL 6005276 (D.D.C.); Bigby v.
Gov’t of V.I., 125 F. Supp. 2d 709 (D.V.I. 2000); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v. Abrams, No. 96 C 6365, 2000
WL 574466 (N.D. Ill.).
89
See Holden et al., supra note 9, at 460 (suggesting three explanations for this infrequency: (1) briberyinduced match fixing doesn’t afflict professional sports; (2) leagues cover up such incidents; (3) the Act
doesn’t reach extortion or blackmail).
90
See Hudson et al., supra note 9; Kevin Carpenter, Global Match-Fixing and the United States’ Role in
Upholding Sporting Integrity, 2 BERKELEY J. ENT. & SPORTS L. 214, 220 (2013) (noting reports that soccer
players are being trafficked from Africa to play in minor professional soccer leagues, forced to match-fix, and
then abandoned).
91
See Henry Hill, How I Put the Fix In, VAULT - SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Feb. 16, 1981),
https://vault.si.com/vault/70925#&gid=ci0258be14200126ef&pid=70925---016---image.
92
See Holden et al., supra note 9, at 138 (explaining that lone-wolf match-fixing “arises when an individual
unilaterally manipulates a sporting event, he is neither bribed nor influenced by others”).
93
See Ira Berkow, College Basketball: Caught in Gambling’s Grip; A Promising Career Unravels at
Northwestern, N.Y. TIMES: ARCHIVES (Apr. 20, 1998), https://www.nytimes.com/1998/04/20/sports/collegebasketball-caught-gambling-s-grip-promising-career-unravels-northwestern.html.
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them on a night on the town to learn they now possess
photographs of him in a compromising situation.
Threatening to make the photos public, they blackmail him
to extract nonpublic information about his team’s injuries,
line-ups, and other subjects that are of odds-making
significance to sports gamblers.94
Four members of a college football team place bets on their
own games. During one of the games they wager on, one
player is suspected of fumbling on purpose to manipulate
the score. No bribery is involved in this internal fraud, and
the prosecutors bring charges only for perjury because the
students lied to the grand jury when they denied placing the
wagers.95
A professional basketball referee violates league rules by
betting on games, including those he officiated, winning 7580 percent of his wagers. His exceptional sportsbook
success comes to the attention of low-level mob associates
who threaten to expose him unless he tips confidential
information about the identity of officiating crews for
upcoming games, referee/team relations, and the physical
condition of certain players. They also demand he provide
predictions of which teams would win upcoming games,
and then pay him for correct picks. The referee continues to
bet on games, including those he officiates.96

The last example tracks the case of Tim Donaghy, a long-time referee for the
National Basketball Association (NBA), who conspired with operators of an
illegal sportsbook to profit from inside information on NBA games. The NBATim Donaghy affair illustrates why the criminal law status quo is problematic.
The government prosecuted and ultimately convicted Donaghy and his coconspirators for wire fraud and transmitting wagering information, based on
Donaghy’s communications with mob-associated bookmakers in which he
would “pick winners” in point-spread betting over the 2006-07 NBA season.97
Because the mobsters did not pay Donaghy to influence games, the government
94
See John T. Holden, Match Fixers Have More Tools to Manipulate Sports Betting Outcomes Than Just
Bribery, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (June 6, 2018), https://www.legalsportsreport.com/20984/match-fixing-primerpart-ii/.
95
Bill Dedman, College Football; 4 Are Indicted in Northwestern Football Scandal, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 1998),
https://www.nytimes.com/1998/12/04/sports/college-football-4-are-indicted-in-northwestern-football-scandal.html.
96
United States v. Donaghy, 570 F. Supp.2d 411, 417–18 (E.D.N.Y. 2008), aff'd sub nom. United States
v. Battista, 575 F.3d 226 (2d Cir. 2009).
97
See United States v. Donaghy, 2007 WL 4189121 (E.D.N.Y.); 18 U.S.C. § 1343; 18 U.S.C. § 1084;
Donaghy, 570 F. Supp. 2d at 415.
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could not invoke the Sports Bribery Act. As for Donaghy’s suspected “lone
wolf” game manipulation prior to the charged conspiracy, that conduct
implicates neither sports bribery nor wire fraud. As opposed to multi-party
organized match-fixing, individually motivated match-fixing can be perpetrated
in the absence of communication with or payment from others, rendering
inadequate all aspects of the available statutory regime.98
In the absence of a U.S. Code provision directly criminalizing game
manipulation, the government built its case on the theory that Donaghy deprived
the NBA of his honest services when he accepted payment from gamblers for
winning picks.99 The dishonesty specified in the charging document was that
Donaghy “compromised his objectivity as a referee because of his personal
financial interest in the outcome of NBA games.”100
Thus, throughout the Donaghy criminal proceedings, the government
expressly disclaimed reliance on the fact that the referee himself bet on NBA
games,101 or the suggestion that he “ever intentionally made a particular ruling
during a game in order to increase the likelihood that his gambling pick would
be correct.”102 The government’s decision not to expend more resources to
investigate underlying game manipulation makes sense given that no additional
statutory predicate was available to charge such conduct.
Yet strong evidence existed that lone-wolf game manipulation occurred.103
Consider Donaghy’s conduct predating the single season of the charged
conspiracy. Three years earlier, Donaghy started using a friend from high school
to place bets on games he officiated, by some accounts winning eighty-eight
percent of the time.104 From 2003 to 2006, he bet on almost every game he
98

See Holden et al., supra note 9, at 141.
18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1346. Section 1341 broadly criminalizes the use of the mails or wires in furtherance
of “any scheme or artifice to defraud,” or “for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent
pretenses, representations, or promises.” Section 1346 defines “scheme or artifice to defraud” to include “a
scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services.” In Skilling v. United States,
561 U.S. 358, 407 (2010), the Supreme Court limited wire fraud prosecutions under an honest services theory
to “offenders who, in violation of a fiduciary duty, participate[] in bribery or kickback schemes.” See also
Kelly v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 1565, 1574 (2020) (holding that the federal honest services fraud statute
bars only schemes to obtain money or property). This limitation renders honest services fraud equally
inadequate to the task of criminalizing game manipulation.
100
See Donaghy, 2007 WL 4189121 at ¶¶ 9-13.
101
Donaghy, 570 F. Supp. 2d at 417.
102
United States. v. Donaghy, No. 07-587 (CBA), Letter from Benton J. Campbell, U.S. Attorney, to Hon.
Carol Bagley Amon, U.S. District Judge, at 5 (May 8, 2008).
103
See Scott Eden, How Former Ref Tim Donaghy Conspired to Fix NBA Games, ESPN (Feb. 19, 2018),
https://www.espn.com/nba/story/_/id/25980368/how-former-ref-tim-donaghy-conspired-fix-nba-games
(reporting the perception that Donaghy was calling more fouls on teams he bet against); cf. NBA Press
Release, NBA Response to ESPN’s Tim Donaghy Story, NBA OFFICIAL (Feb. 22, 2019),
https://official.nba.com/nba-response-espn-tim-donaghy-story/; LAWRENCE B. PEDOWITZ ET AL., REPORT TO
THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE NATIONAL BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION (Oct. 1, 2008),
https://www.nba.com/media/PedowitzReport.pdf (finding, after independent review of NBA officiating
program, no evidence of game manipulation).
104
See Eden, supra note 103.
99
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officiated.105 According to box scores of those games, Donaghy was calling
more fouls on the team he bet against and fewer fouls on the team he bet on.106
Notably this conduct was not offered as the basis for any offense charged by the
prosecution.107
Instead, the Donaghy prosecution focused exclusively on the four-month
period from December 1, 2006 to April 30, 2007, by which point the
bookmakers had noticed the unusual size and success of Donaghy’s bets and
hijacked his scheme. They initiated the charged conspiracy by extorting
Donaghy to limit his own wagers to avoid arousing suspicion in the betting
markets. They then demanded he tip them his point-spread picks on a wide range
of NBA games in exchange for a fee when their bets won.108 This conduct also
falls through the gaps of the Sports Bribery Act because it involved threats and
coercion, not bribery, and did not explicitly require game manipulation.109
In its letter to the sentencing judge detailing Donaghy’s cooperation with
respect to this charged conspiracy, the government made two somewhat
contradictory statements on the subject of game manipulation that highlight the
difficulty it faced in basing a prosecution on such conduct:
•

•

“[Donaghy] compromised his objectivity as a referee because of
his personal financial interest in the outcome of NBA games,
and that this personal interest might have subconsciously
affected his on-court performance.”
“There is no evidence that Donaghy ever intentionally made a
particular ruling during a game in order to increase the
likelihood that his gambling pick would be correct.”110

With no additional charging options available to prosecute game manipulation,
the government had no reason to invest in resolving this cognitive dissonance.
The resulting criminal case outcome vastly understates the harms inflicted by
Donaghy’s corruption.
Victims of game manipulation exist, and the NBA certainly considered itself
one, requesting restitution for the cost of its internal investigation of the full
range of Donaghy’s misconduct and for Donaghy’s salary during the entire fouryear period that he was betting on games, including before the conspiracy

105

See id.
See id.
107
United States v. Donaghy, 2007 WL 4189121 (E.D.N.Y.).
108
See Eden, supra note 103.
109
See id.
110
United States. v. Donaghy, No. 07-587 (CBA), Letter from Benton J. Campbell, U.S. Attorney, to Hon.
Carol Bagley Amon, U.S. District Judge, at 5 (May 8, 2008).
106
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started.111 The sentencing court allowed recovery of only those NBA outlays in
connection with assisting the government’s narrower investigation and
Donaghy’s salary for the one conspiracy season. The court’s ruling accentuates
the statutory gap:
Donaghy’s offense of conviction was not his broad scheme to
defraud the NBA, but rather, a narrower conspiracy to enter into
a scheme with [his bookies], the unlawful goal of which was to
defraud the NBA. [Federal law] . . . does not allow for recovery
for what are acts in furtherance of a broader uncharged scheme
being carried out alone by one of the co-conspirators.112
In other words, existing federal law provides paltry grounds for addressing and
remedying the harms to the honesty of athletic contests.113
After PASPA’s repeal, the only effort at the federal level to enact minimum
integrity standards for legal sports betting resided in the Hatch-Schumer bill
introduced in the Senate in late 2018.114 The now moribund bill set forth a
framework for public-private coordination and enforcement of anti-corruption
efforts including: use of official league data to determine betting outcomes;
sharing of betting data among sportsbooks, leagues, and law enforcement;
league authority to veto types of wagers; prohibition of sports wagers by league
personnel; and mandatory sportsbook disclosure of suspicious betting
activity.115 Laudably, the bill also offered “improvements” to the Sports Bribery
Act to criminalize other methods used by match-fixers such as extortion and
blackmail, codifying the sponsors’ fear of “the likelihood that players will be
exposed to bribes, exploitation, and other forms of corruption endemic to an
environment where sports betting is poorly regulated.”116 The bill expired at the
end of the 115th Congress, and no alternative has since been introduced.
Whether the federal government is the appropriate enforcer of sports
integrity is fair to debate given the states’ traditional role in regulating
gaming.117 States (and tribes) currently regulate casino gambling, horse racing,
lotteries, and the like, and have developed expertise in doing so.118 However,
111
United States v. Donaghy, 570 F. Supp. 2d 411, 419, 424 (E.D.N.Y. 2008); see also Ross et al., supra
note 25, at 27 (observing that “[t]he Donaghy scandal caused substantial harm to the NBA”).
112
Donaghy, 570 F. Supp. 2d at 427 (emphasis added).
113
CABOT ET AL., supra note 14, at 147.
114
Sports Wagering Market Integrity Act of 2018, S. 3793, 115th Cong. §§ 101 et seq. (2018).
115
Sports Wagering Market Integrity Act of 2018, S. 3793, 115 th Cong. § 103(b)(3), (4), (5), (13).
116
Sports Wagering Market Integrity Act of 2018, S. 3793, 115 th Cong. § 302 (also providing whistleblower
protections to those who disclose possible violations); Orrin G. Hatch, Sports Betting Is Inevitable--Let's Make
Sure It's Done Right, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (May 23, 2018), http://www.si.com/moresports/2018/05/23/sports-betting-senator-orrin-hatch-legislation.
117
See State v. Rosenthal, 559 P.2d 830, 836 (Nev. 1977).
118
Roberts et al., supra note 85, at 89.
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those gambling businesses offer an integrated entertainment experience where
both the wager and the future contingent event on which the wager is placed—
the roll of the dice, the equestrian performance—take place physically within
the state, subject to regulatory oversight. The state regulator has the authority to
control not only the terms and performance of the wagering contract, but also
the rules and integrity of the future contingent event.119
Sports wagering is different because the underlying contingent event—the
athletic contest—is (for the most part) beyond the physical and legal control of
the betting operator and the state regulators. Sports contests that serve as the
future contingent event for an in-state wager frequently occur beyond the state’s
borders.120 Thus, it’s been argued that at least as it concerns sports integrity,
where states have no authority to superintend events beyond their jurisdiction,
federal involvement is necessary.121 That need is amplified by the states’ lack of
interest in regulating game integrity, as the next section shows.
B. Weak Sports Integrity Protection at the State Level
By 2021, sports bettors in nearly half of U.S. jurisdictions will no longer have
to seek out an illegal bookmaker or go to Las Vegas to place their bets.122 Yet,
those jurisdictions have devoted little regulatory attention to the integrity of the
underlying sports contests. The new state laws enabling sports gambling
primarily focus on sportsbook licensure requirements and taxation of the
revenue.123 Most states are following the Nevada model and empowering
existing regulatory bodies to oversee sports gambling rather than creating
oversight boards specific to this one type of wager.124 This mirrors their
approach to the match-fixing risk—states are relying in large part on existing

119
Keith C. Miller & Anthony N. Cabot, Regulatory Models for Sports Wagering: The Debate Between
State vs. Federal Oversight, 8 UNLV GAMING L.J. 153, 166-67 (2018).
120
Id. (observing that the federal government has asserted regulatory authority over casino operations when
it implicates cross-border transactions such as money laundering).
121
Roberts et al., supra note 85, at 90.
122
Twenty-four jurisdictions have now legalized sports betting and another twenty-four have introduced
sports gambling bills. Rodenberg, supra note 4; see also Gouker, supra note 4. The jurisdiction with legal
sports gambling, some pending launch, are Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, District of Columbia, Illinois,
Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, New
Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Virginia, Washington,
and West Virginia.
123
See, e.g., 10 DEL. ADMIN. CODE § 204 (2020); MONT. ADMIN. R. 23.16 (2020); An Act Relating to
State Affairs and Gov’t – Video Lottery Games, Table Games, and Sports Wagering, R.I. S.B. 37 (2019).
124
See generally Becky Harris, Regulated Sports Betting: A Nevada Perspective, 10 UNLV GAMING L.J.
75 (2020); see also John T. Holden, Regulating Sports Wagering, 105 IOWA L. REV. 575, 597 (2020); Patrick
Moran, Anyone’s Game: Sports-Betting Regulations After Murphy v. NCAA, CATO INST. (Mar. 11, 2019)
(reporting on states that have delegated to existing gaming commissions, lotteries, and racing boards),
https://www.cato.org/publications/legal-policy-bulletin/anyones-game-sports-betting-regulations-aftermurphy-v-ncaa#full.
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general penal code provisions rather than defining criminal offenses specific to
preserving honest athletic competition.125
None of the twenty-four jurisdictions that have thus far legalized sports
wagering include in the enabling legislation a provision that criminalizes matchfixing. The principal way the new state sports gambling regimes acknowledge
game integrity issues is by requiring sportsbook operators to monitor and report
suspicious activities and betting anomalies that suggest match-fixing or a
bettor’s access to inside information with competitive significance.126 “Beyond
that, the risk of sports corruption is implicitly acknowledged in the statutes’
attempts to narrow opportunities for corruption by restricting who may bet, on
what type of contests [or ‘wagering events,’] and in what amounts.”127 The
frailty of these protections came to the fore during the Covid-19 pandemic of
2020 when the cessation of U.S. sports led states to hastily approve new
“wagering events.”128 In a “pandemic move” that prioritized revenue over
integrity, numerous states authorized betting on table tennis events taking place
in Russia and Ukraine that were later discovered to be fixed.129
Only one state—West Virginia—incorporates in its sports gambling statute
a penal provision that directly addresses game integrity, as distinguished from
betting integrity. In language redundant of the state’s extant sports bribery law,
West Virginia’s Sports Wagering Act makes it a felony when someone “offers,
promises, or gives anything of value to anyone for the purpose of influencing
the outcome of a . . . sporting event . . . .” 130 This offense basically mirrors the
federal Sports Bribery Act.131
The explanation for sports gambling legislation’s inattention to integrity
issues may reside in the fact most state penal codes already criminalize sports
bribery.132 Thirty-six states and the District of Columbia criminalize bribery of
both officials and participants in professional and amateur sports.133 Another ten

125
E.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 11.46.660 (West 2019); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 11, § 881 (1995); WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 134.05 (West 2019).
126
See, e.g., Miss. Gaming Comm. Reg. Part 9, R. 3.19 Sports Integrity (requiring licensees to establish
internal controls to identify suspicious wagers, and report those to the gaming commission).
127
See Balsam, supra note 1, at 12-14.
128
See, e.g., N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 13:69N-1.11 (2020) (requiring sportsbooks to establish the bona fides of
sports contests on which it proposes to accept patron wagers).
129
David Purdum, New Jersey Suspends Betting on Ukrainian Table Tennis After Match-Fixing Alert, ESPN (July
9, 2020), https://www.espn.com/chalk/story/_/id/29436278/new-jersey-suspends-betting-ukrainian-table-tennis-matchfixing-alert; see also Paula Lavigne et al., Gambling on Table Tennis Is Blowing Up—But Are the Matches Legit?, ESPN
(May 25, 2020), https://www.espn.com/chalk/story/_/id/29206521/gambling-table-tennis-blowing-the-matches-legit.
130
W. VA. CODE § 29-22D-21 (2019); compare W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-10-22 (West 2020) (making it a
felony when someone “gives, promises or offers to any professional or amateur [sports participant or official]
any valuable thing with intent to influence him to lose or try to lose or cause to be lost a [sporting event]”).
131
See 18 U.S.C. § 224.
132
See id.
133
See PAUL H. ROBINSON & TYLER SCOT WILLIAMS, MAPPING AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW: VARIATIONS
ACROSS THE 50 STATES 296–297 (ABC-CLIO 2018).
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states define the crime to target bribery only of sports participants.134 Only four
states do not have special criminal statutes penalizing sports bribery.135
In addition, thirty-eight states define a general commercial bribery offense,
including three of the four states without a sports bribery offense.136 Most such
laws are substantively consistent with the Model Penal Code bribery statute that
criminalizes a secret payment to the employee or agent of a private business to
influence its operations.137 These laws potentially cover bribery in sports as well,
depending on the statutory language and factual setting. However, the separate
treatment of sports bribery in many state penal codes is in part an
acknowledgment of the unique public trust placed in the honesty of sports
contests, and of the difficulty of applying a general commercial bribery statute
to an athlete’s failure to give “best efforts” or to game manipulation by an unpaid
amateur athlete.138
State sports bribery offenses often track the federal Sports Bribery Act,
making it a felony to give or receive a benefit in exchange for influencing the
outcome of a sports contest.139 It is worth examining the state versions for their
expressive value and largely unmet aspirations. For example, Illinois’s statute
penalizes:
[a]ny person who, with intent to influence any person
participating in, officiating or connected with any professional
or amateur athletic contest, sporting event or exhibition, gives,
offers or promises any money, bribe or other thing of value or
advantage to induce such participant, official or other person not
to use his best efforts in connection with such contest, event or
exhibition.140

134
See id. at 299 (Arkansas, Georgia, Indiana, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, New Mexico,
Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin).
135
See id. (Alaska, Idaho, South Dakota, and Vermont).
136
See id. at 296; Ryan J. Rohlfsen, Recent Developments in Foreign and Domestic Criminal Commercial
Bribery Laws, 2012 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 151, 163 app. (2012). Idaho is the only state without either a general
commercial bribery or sports bribery offense.
137
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 224.8 (2019).
138
See ROBINSON ET AL., supra note 133, at 296-97.
139
For analogous state sports bribery statutes, see, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2309 (2020); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 337a-e (West 2020); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 838.12 (West 2020); LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:118.1
(2020); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 165.085–165.090 (West 2020). The Sports Bribery Act provides that it “shall
not be construed as indicating an intent on the part of Congress to occupy the field in which this section
operates to the exclusion of a law of any State.” 18 U.S.C. § 224(b).
140
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/29-1(a) (West 2020).
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In notable contrast to the federal version, eleven of the jurisdictions with sports
bribery laws classify the offense only as a misdemeanor, potentially impairing
its deterrent and expressive value.141
“Sports participants” are usually defined in state statutes to include players
and other game participants.142 Florida casts a particularly wide net of
culpability, with a sports bribery statute that captures players, owners,
managers, coaches, trainers, any relative of the above, and “any person having
any direct, indirect, remote or possible connection” with a team or match
participant.143 What constitutes game manipulation by a sports participant can
extend beyond influencing the outcome to limiting the margin of victory or
altering the course of play.144 Some statutes go further and apply to “sports
officials,” defined as the neutrals who serve as judges, referees, or umpires in
athletic contests.145 Criminal culpability can attach whenever a bribe induces
improper performance of an official’s duties, even if it does not change the
outcome of the game.146 In addition to criminalizing sports bribery, some states
impose a duty on sports officials and participants to report the offer of a bribe.147
Lacking whistle-blower protections, however, the statutory framework may not
provide sufficient incentive to come forward.148
Fifteen states also criminalize “tampering with a sports contest,” which
targets more broadly cheating in sports, however carried out by any offender,
even third parties not affiliated with the contest.149 For example, Texas makes it
141
See ALA. CODE § 13A-11-141-2 (2020); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 11, § 881-2 (2020); HAW. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 708-881 (West 2020); IOWA CODE ANN. § 722.3 (West 2020); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 9-204
(West 2020); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 207.290 (West 2020); PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4108 (West
2020); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §22-43-2 (2020); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-1103 (West 2020); TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 32.44 (West 2020); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-508 (West 2020); see also Jeffrey Boles,
Examining the Lax Treatment of Commercial Bribery in the United States: A Prescription for Reform, 51 AM.
BUS. L.J. 119, 158 (2014) (recommending uniformly classifying commercial bribery as a felony to “properly
communicate[] the seriousness of the crime to the public, . . . raise social awareness and carry a deterrent
effect”).
142
See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6507(c)(2)-(3) (West 2020) (defining “sports participant” as “any
person who participates or expects to participate in a sports contest as a player, contestant or member of a
team, or as a coach, manager, trainer or other person directly associated with a player, contestant or team;”
and “sports official” as “any person who acts or expects to act in a sports contest as an umpire, referee, judge
or otherwise to officiate at a sports contest”).
143
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 838.12 (West 2020).
144
Id.
145
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6507(c)(3) (West 2020).
146
See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6507(a)(4) (West 2020).
147
See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/29-3 (West 2020).
148
See Holden et al., supra note 9, at 472.
149
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-11-143 (2020); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-5-403 (West 2020); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-162 (West 2020); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 708-881 (West 2020); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§21-6508 (West 2020); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 518.060 (West 2020); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, §
901(1)(I) (2020); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-614 (West 2020); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 638:8(I)(c) (2020);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 638:8 (2020); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:21-11 (West 2020); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 180.50
(McKinney 1982); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-12-07 (West 2020); 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 4109 (West 2020); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 32.44 (West 2020); see generally ROBINSON ET AL., supra
note 133, at 299.
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a misdemeanor to, “with intent to affect the outcome . . . of a publicly exhibited
contest . . . tamper with a person, animal, or thing in a manner contrary to the
rules of the contest.”150 If Massachusetts had a similar penal provision in 2015,
Tom Brady and company could potentially have been criminally prosecuted for
deflating footballs during a post-season playoff game, in addition to league
disciplinary sanctions.151
All told, almost every jurisdiction had previously enacted some penal
provision arguably relevant to match-fixing, either a general commercial bribery
statute or a specific sports bribery or tampering offense.152 States that host
significant sports activity, such as New York and Texas for professional sports,
Alabama for college sports, and Kentucky for horseracing, have tended to
legislate more comprehensively in this area, although not consistently so. 153
Limited statutory attention may indicate legislative inertia or the absence of any
major match-fixing scandal in that state.154
But most state penal codes nonetheless suffer from the same gaps as the
federal Sports Bribery Act, and are inadequate to address game manipulation
perpetrated by extortion, blackmail, duress, or lone-wolf conduct.155 And as with
federal counterparts, state prosecutions of sports bribery or tampering are
exceedingly rare.156 Of the forty–six jurisdictions with sports bribery/tampering
statutes, Westlaw’s “notes of decisions” and “citing references” record a
combined total of nine prosecutions, none more recent than 1987.157 Like the
federal Sports Bribery Act, none of those prosecutions involves a major
professional team sporting contest. This paucity likely reflects that, as a matter
of both federal and state law enforcement priorities, commercial bribery is “the
most under-prosecuted crime in penal law.”158 Reasons for this disinterest
include “the extreme challenge prosecutors face in discovering the wrongful
conduct, gathering evidence, and prosecuting the offense.”159 With respect to
150

TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 32.44 (West 2020).
See CABOT ET AL., supra note 14, at 109.
152
See ROBINSON ET AL., supra note 133, at 299.
153
See id. at 300.
154
See id.
155
See supra Part III.A; see, e.g., United States v. Malizia, 720 F.2d 744, 746 (2d Cir. 1983) (reversing
RICO conviction predicated on violation of New York Sports Bribery statute because groom was bribed to
drug competitors’ horses to help his horses win, not lose).
156
See Holden et al., supra note 9; CABOT ET AL., supra note 14, at 148.
157
See generally State of Minnesota v. Spencer, 414 N.W.2d 528, 532 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (horseracing);
State of Louisiana v. Trosclair, 443 So. 2d 1098, 1101 (La. 1983) (horseracing); State v. Ciulla, 115 R.I. 558,
351 A.2d 580 (1976) (horseracing); State of North Carolina v. Goldberg, 134 S.E.2d 334 (N.C. 1964) (college
basketball); State of Hawaii v. Yoshida, 361 P.2d 1032 (Haw. 1961) (college basketball); People v. Aragon,
316 P.2d 370 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957) (boxing); State of Iowa v. Di Paglia, 71 N.W.2d 601, 602 (Iowa 1955)
(college basketball); Glickfield v. State, 101 A.2d 229, 231 (Md. 1953) (college football); People v. Phillips,
173 P.2d 392 (Cal. Ct. App. 1946) (boxing).
158
Boles, supra note 141, at 158, 165 (observing that the secrecy surrounding a bribery transaction makes
it difficult to detect and prosecute it).
159
Id.
151
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sports bribery, that challenge argues for more precisely defining criminal
offenses encompassing game manipulation.
In the current landscape of legal sports gambling, preoccupied with getting
sportsbooks up and running and generating tax revenue, more attention should
be paid to protecting the source of that revenue—the underlying athletic
competitions. At a minimum, the outdated “patchwork” of federal and state laws
addressing sports corruption requires “updating.”160 Detecting and prosecuting
competition manipulation requires “a set of effective [criminal] laws, and the
motivation to enforce those laws.”161 One model for such laws can be found in
work being done internationally to combat a growing plague of match-fixing.162
IV. LEARNING FROM INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE WITH GAMBLINGRELATED MATCH-FIXING
Betting-related match-fixing has intensified in international markets, driven
by sophisticated criminal organizations.163 Match-fixing expert Declan Hill
describes the current wave of gambling-related corruption in sport as a
“revolution”—“an utterly modern phenomenon [that] will destroy sports as we
know them.”164 His alarm springs from the merging of worldwide sports
gambling markets, facilitated by technology and globalization, and increasingly
dominated by the profoundly corrupt and largely illegal Asian markets.165 The
Chinese soccer league has been described as a “national disgrace,” and match
fixing has been confirmed in Vietnam, Hong Kong, Indonesia, South Korea,
Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore.166
The sham that has become Asian soccer has left its fans hungry for alternative
honest contests to wager on, and that has led the Asian fixers to Europe and
other parts of the world.167 Asian and European criminal gambling interests now
collude on match-fixing, as exposed in the 2009 European soccer betting
scandal. That scheme originated out of Singapore, with funding from Chinese
organized crime groups, to fix as many as 380 matches in nine European
countries, implicating around 200 people, including players, referees, coaches,

160

Holden, supra note 6, at 382.
CABOT ET AL., supra note 14, at 146. I addressed in an earlier paper the role of sports governing bodies
in policing game integrity, and the inadequacies and disincentives of private parties to secure effective
deterrence and punishment. See Balsam, supra note 1, at 9-11.
162
See, e.g., ASSER INST. EU 28 STUDY, supra note 56, at 139.
163
Carpenter, supra note 90, at 215.
164
Declan Hill, The Revolution, in SPORTS BETTING: LAW AND POLICY, 9-13 (Paul M. Anderson et al.
ed., 2011).
165
See Hill, supra note 164, at 10–11.
166
Id. at 11.
167
See id. at 12-13 (describing Asian gambling companies monitoring matches across the spectrum,
including those as minor as the Tivoli Cup, a youth tournament for Denmark teens).
161
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and other match officials.168 Authorities on sports betting and game integrity
conclude it would be “naïve” to think that match-fixing has not also penetrated
almost every sport.169
As the plague of match-fixing spread, in 2011, Interpol, the international law
enforcement organization, created an Integrity in Sport unit. Among other
things, the unit compiles a bi-weekly bulletin on global corruption across all
sports, including soccer, tennis, cricket, rugby, esports, and basketball.170 Just in
the latter half of 2019, European soccer alone generated six match-fixing
reports:171
•
•

•
•
•

•

Spain—fixing of 2019 La Liga match between Valencia and
Real Valladolid.
Albania—Skenderbeu club president organized matchfixing of two Champions League qualifying games and two
Europa League group-stage games in 2015, and around fifty
domestic matches since 2011.
Belgium—three Belgium under-sixteen players reported
being approached and offered $50,000 to fix a game in
2018.
Sweden—thirteen matches in Division 2 soccer league in
2019 suspected of being influenced by gambling activity.
Ireland—four 2019 League of Ireland matches suspected of
being fixed after large bets placed on winning team, and
other team suffered unusual number of fouls and yellow
cards.
Italy—gambling interests arranged to fix four Serie A
games in 2014.

168
See INTERPOL-IOC HANDBOOK, supra note 20, at 25. This scandal is known as the Bochum Competition
Manipulation, after the town in Germany where the scheme was initially detected. It involved domestic league
games in nine European countries: Germany, Belgium, Switzerland, Croatia, Slovenia, Turkey, Hungary,
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Austria. It also involved twelve qualifying matches in the UEFA Europa League,
and three in the UEFA Champions League.
169
See Match-Fixing & Corruption in Sport—An Historical Timeline, supra note 74 (listing episodes of
match-fixing since 2000 across soccer, tennis, cricket, horse-racing, boxing, basketball, football, and snooker);
Keating, supra note 74.
170
Interpol, Corruption in Sport, https://www.interpol.int/en/Crimes/Corruption/Corruption-in-sport (last
visited July 31, 2020).
171
See Id. Collectively these bulletins identify approximately forty episodes of match-fixing in this sixmonth period, across Africa, Asia, Europe, Oceania, and South America, involving, in addition to soccer,
Australian rules football, badminton, basketball, cricket, esports, rugby, tennis, and volleyball; see also Louis
Weston, Sports Integrity (Betting and Financial Corruption)–the Year in Review 2019/20,” LAWINSPORT
(June 12, 2020), https://www.lawinsport.com/topics/item/sports-integrity-betting-and-financial-corruptionthe-year-in-review-2019-20#_ftn11.
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A Sorbonne study calls the manipulation of athletic contests a “worldwide
phenomenon threatening the foundations of modern sport.”172 FederBet, an
international non-profit organization that advocates for operators and consumers
in the gaming sector, estimates that betting-related game manipulation currently
occurs in over 1,000 European athletic contests each year.173 The match-fixing
epidemic has already reached North America. The semi-professional Canadian
Soccer League has been repeatedly compromised by match-fixing originating
from the Asian gambling markets.174 Even the 2020 Covid-19 pandemic did not
offer respite from the growing integrity risk to sport, despite the temporary
cessation of most competitions.175 Leading authorities on sports corruption
expressed concern that, as the pandemic impacts athlete salaries “and the
economic situation places pressure on sport, criminal groups and corruptors may
seek to exploit this situation to gain influence.”176
A. International Criminal Justice Response to Match-Fixing
International public and non-governmental organizations have responded to
the integrity threat by urging a criminal justice response to match-fixing “as a
complement to independent sporting sanction systems.”177 In the Handbook on
Protecting Sport from Competition Manipulation, Interpol and the International
Olympic Committee (IOC) make the case for a stronger partnership between
sports governing bodies and law enforcement:
Traditionally, the principle of sports autonomy has meant that
the world of sports and law enforcement have seldom
172
See SORBONNE-ICSS REP., supra note 12, at 4. The report estimates that criminal groups launder $140
billion a year by match fixing and illegal betting, with 53% of illegal bets coming from Asia. Id. at 22.
173
See Match Fixing, FEDERBET, http://federbet.com/match-fixing/ (last visited July 31, 2020); see also
FEDERBET, FEDERBET ANNUAL FIXED MATCHES REPORT 2016,
https://www.sportsintegrityinitiative.com/wp- content/uploads/2016/06/DR8_Federbet_2016_report-1.pdf
(last visited July 31, 2020) (specifically identifying over 220 fixed matches across a dozen sports, based on
betting patterns). Illegal gains from such match-fixing represent up to $8.8 billion. See Carpenter, supra note
90 at 219–20.
174
See Declan Hill, Semi-Pro Canadian Soccer League a Hotspot of Match-Fixing, THE STAR (Dec. 12,
2016),
https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2016/12/12/semi-pro-canadian-soccer-league-a-hotspot-ofmatch-fixing.html.
175
GLOBAL LOTTERY MONITORING SYS., A STUDY OF BETTING OPERATORS AND THEIR SPONSORSHIP OF SPORT 7 (July
2020), https://glms-sport.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/20_GLMS_SPONSORSHIP_REPORT_Final-July-2020.pdf.
176
UNITED NATIONS OFF. ON DRUGS AND CRIME, INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE, AND INTERPOL,
PREVENTING CORRUPTION IN SPORT AND MANIPULATION OF COMPETITIONS 2 (July 2020),
https://www.unodc.org/documents/Safeguardingsport/Documents/COVID-19_and_AntiCorruption_FINAL_VERSION_2.pdf.
177
UNITED NATIONS OFF. ON DRUGS AND CRIME AND INT’L OLYMPIC COMM., CRIMINALIZATION APPROACHES TO
COMBAT MATCH-FIXING AND ILLEGAL/IRREGULAR BETTING: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 1 (July 2013),
www.unodc.org/documents/corruption/Publications/2013/Criminalization_approaches_to_combat_match-fixing.pdf
[hereinafter UNODC-IOC 2013 CRIMINALIZATION STUDY]; see also SORBONNE-ICSS REP., supra note 12, at 102–09;
ASSER INST. EU 28 STUDY, supra note 56, at 139.
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cooperated. However, sport cannot deal alone with the criminal
threat posed by competition manipulation and requires police
support, particularly with regards to obtaining the evidence in
order to sanction an individual under their jurisdiction.178
Put plainly, sports governing bodies lack the necessary jurisdiction over nonparticipants, the subpoena authority to obtain evidence, and the expertise and
resources to undertake complex investigations into corrupt schemes likely to
encompass fraud, bribery, organized crime, and money-laundering.179 In
addition to these justifications is the expressive power of a criminal justice
response against match-fixing, which “would demonstrate that sporting
manipulation is not [sic] a ‘simple’ breach of sporting rules, but also an offence
against the public in a broader sense.”180
A criminal justice response was officially endorsed by the Council of Europe
as of September 2019 when its Convention on the Manipulation of Sports
Competitions (the Macolin Convention) entered into force.181 Hailed as
“potentially the most significant legal instrument relating to match-fixing
worldwide,” the Macolin Convention sets out a framework and policy for the
fight against manipulation of sport. 182 Its signature innovation is the concept of
the ”national platform”—an official entity that joins public and private
stakeholders to coordinate and centralize operational, informational, strategic,
and enforcement activities relating to competition manipulation.183 Treaty
ratifiers commit to establish an institutional structure under which disparate
agencies, including police and prosecutorial entities, sports governing bodies,
and betting regulators, work together to combat sports corruption.184

178
See INTERPOL-IOC HANDBOOK, supra note 20, at 57; see also Balsam, supra note 1, at 7-8 (critiquing
U.S. sports governing bodies’ rules and sanctions for betting on sports and game manipulation); Holden, supra
note 6, at 381–82 (observing that sport governing bodies ”lack the law enforcement capabilities . . . such as
the power to obtain search warrants and conduct investigations”).
179
Interpol-IOC Handbook, supra note 19, at 65.
180
UNODC-IOC 2013 CRIMINALIZATION STUDY, supra note 177.
181
Macolin Convention, supra note 19. As of July 2020, 30 of the 47 Council members have signed the
treaty, seven of which have also ratified it. The treaty is open for signature by non-member nations, and
Australia has signed on. See Details of Treaty No.215, COUNCIL OF EUROPE CONVENTION ON THE
MANIPULATION
OF
SPORTS
COMPETITIONS,
https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list//conventions/treaty/215 (last visited July 31, 2020).
182
Kevin Carpenter, Combating Match-Fixing in Sport—a Guide to the Council of Europe’s Convention on the
Manipulation of Sports Competitions, LAWINSPORT (Oct. 4, 2014), https://www.lawinsport.com/topics/criminallaw/item/combating-match-fixing-in-sport-a-guide-to-the-council-of-europe-s-convention-on-the-manipulation-of-sportscompetitions?category_id=149.
183
Macolin Convention, supra note 19, at 8.
184
Id.; see generally Marc Henzelin et al., Why ‘National Platforms’ Are the Cornerstone in the Fight
Against Match-Fixing in Sport: The Macolin Convention, LAWINSPORT (June 18, 2018),
https://www.lawinsport.com/topics/item/why-national-platforms-are-the-cornerstone-in-the-fight-againstmatch-fixing-in-sport-the-macolin-convention.
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With respect to criminal sanctions, the Macolin Convention requires each
signatory nation to “ensure that its domestic laws enable to criminally sanction
manipulation of sports competitions when it involves either coercive, corrupt or
fraudulent practices, as defined by its domestic law.”185 The treaty permits
parties to either rely on existing general laws or create new offenses, as long as
the route taken adequately covers three categories of conduct: (1) violence,
coercion, or threat; (2) corruption or bribery; and (3) fraud and free agreement
by sports participants.186
Experience, however, has shown that general penal provisions are often
inadequate to address the specific context of sports.187 In a series of joint studies
on best practices in protecting sports integrity, the United Nations Office on
Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the International Olympic Committee (IOC)
blame numerous “substantial loopholes” in national criminal codes for impeding
the efforts of law enforcement agencies and judicial authorities to combat
match-fixing.188 Examples include the 2012 Swiss prosecution of three soccer
players involved in the infamous Bochum match-fixing scandal who
manipulated games to try to generate winnings on electronic betting
platforms.189 The Swiss federal court acquitted the athletes under a general fraud
provision stating that it was unsuitable to allow their conviction.190 A federal
commission was convened to review the disappointing outcome, ultimately
leading to adoption of a specific criminal offense for match-fixing in sports.191
Germany, likewise shaken by the Bochum scheme, revised its criminal code

185

Macolin Convention, supra note 19, at 9.
COUNCIL OF EUR. EXPLANATORY REP., supra note 22, at 21; see SORBONNE--ICSS REP., supra note
12, at 39. The Macolin Convention builds on other international legal instruments that address corruption and
organized crime, namely the United Nations Convention against Corruption and the United Nations
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. UNITED NATIONS OFF. ON DRUGS AND CRIME AND THE
INT’L OLYMPIC COMM., MODEL CRIMINAL LAW PROVISIONS FOR THE PROSECUTION OF COMPETITION
MANIPULATION
13
(2016),
https://www.unodc.org/documents/corruption/Publications/UNODCIOC_Model_Criminal_Law_Provisions_for_the_Prosecution_of_Competition_Manipulation_Booklet.pdf
[hereinafter UNODC-IOC MODEL CRIM. CODE].
187
UNITED NATIONS OFF. ON DRUGS AND CRIME AND THE INT’L OLYMPIC COMM., CRIMINAL PROVISIONS
FOR THE PROSECUTION OF COMPETITION MANIPULATION 10 (2016),
https://www.unodc.org/documents/corruption/Publications/2017/UNODC-IOC-Study.pdf
[hereinafter
UNODC-IOC 2016 CRIMINALIZATION STUDY] (“a specific criminal offence may be more effective than
relying on general criminal law provisions”).
188
UNODC-IOC 2013 CRIMINALIZATION STUDY, supra note 177, at 14; See Carpenter, supra note 11.
189
See INTERPOL-IOC HANDBOOK, supra note 168, and accompanying text.
190
Footballers Cleared of Fraud Charges, SWISSINFO.CH (Nov. 13, 2012),
https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/court-ruling_footballers-cleared-of-fraud-charges/33951902 (finding the
defendants, who placed only online bets, did not defraud a human being as required by the statute).
191
Philippe Vladimir Boss, Tackling Match-Fixing in Switzerland, LAWINSPORT (July 31, 2019),
https://www.lawinsport.com/topics/item/tackling-match-fixing-in-switzerland-the-new-duties-oninternational-sports-federations-to-monitor-report-suspected-matchmanipulations#:~:text=Expert%20Services,Tackling%20match%2Dfixing%20in%20Switzerland%3A%20t
he%20new%20duties%20on%20International,monitor%20%26%20report%20suspected%20match%20man
ipulations&text=Although%20the%20Convention%20has%20not,effect%20on%201%20January%202019.
186
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when prosecutions of the athletes and referees involved revealed difficulties in
applying its general fraud provisions to that setting.192
Sweden completely overhauled its gambling legislation in 2019 in part to
address game integrity issues after fifty-four cases of match-fixing in soccer
were suspected during 2012-2017, but only four cases led to a criminal
conviction.193 The new Swedish law defines match-fixing itself as a criminal
offense in order to make it easier to achieve convictions.194 India, which
continues to prohibit sports gambling, suffered a spate of match-fixing and spotfixing scandals over the past decade in its most popular sport of cricket.195 This
development, along with rampant illegal sports betting, led the Law
Commission of India to urge expressly criminalizing match-fixing and sports
fraud.196 That recommendation was endorsed by the International Cricket
Council (ICC) in anticipation of India hosting two of its major global events in
2021 and 2023.197 According to the ICC’s Anti-Corruption Unit (ACU), without
a specific offense incriminating match-fixing, the Indian police will be
“operating with one hand tied behind their back.”198 The ACU describes matchfixing legislation as “a game-changer” and “the single-most-effective thing to
happen in terms of protecting sport.”199
Consensus is thus forming around the utility of nations establishing specific
criminal offenses concerning the manipulation of a sporting event.200 Not only
are such laws more effective in practice, they “reinforce the educational and
192
Christian Keidel, A Guide to Germany’s New Criminal Law Against Betting Fraud and Match-Fixing
in Sports, LAWINSPORT (Sept. 4, 2017), https://www.lawinsport.com/topics/item/a-guide-to-germany-s-newcriminal-law-against-betting-fraud-and-match-fixing-in-sports.
193
Jamie McDonald, How Sweden’s New Gaming and Betting Market Works and Its Potential Impact on
the Sports Industry, LAWINSPORT (Apr. 10, 2019), https://www.lawinsport.com/topics/articles/item/howsweden-s-new-gaming-and-betting-market-works-and-its-potential-impact-on-the-sports-industry.
194
Id.
195
Kevin Carpenter, Establishing the Optimum Sports Betting Regulatory System to Protect the Integrity
of Indian Sports, LAWINSPORT (Nov. 21, 2018), https://www.lawinsport.com/topics/item/establishing-theoptimum-sports-betting-regulatory-system-to-protect-the-integrity-of-indian-sports#sdfootnote26anc.
196
L. COMM. OF INDIA, LEGAL FRAMEWORK: GAMBLING AND SPORTS BETTING INCLUDING CRICKET IN
INDIA 121 (July 2018),
https://www.prsindia.org/sites/default/files/parliament_or_policy_pdfs/LCI%20Report%20Summary%20%20Betting%20and%20Gambling_ST_For%20Upload.pdf.
197
Steve Richardson Believes Match-Fixing Law in India Will Be a ‘Game-Changer’, ROYAL
CHALLENGERS (June 26, 2020), https://www.royalchallengers.com/rcb-cricket-news/news/steve-richardsonbelieves-match-fixing-law-in-india-will-be-a-game-changer?amp.
198
Id.
199
Id.
200
UNODC-IOC 2013 CRIMINALIZATION STUDY, supra note 177, at 1; UNODC-IOC 2016
CRIMINALIZATION STUDY, supra note 187, at 10; UNODC-IOC MODEL CRIM. CODE, supra note 186, at 10
(observing that general criminal laws leave “gaps . . . which allow offenders to avoid the most severe
consequences of their deeds”); see also UNITED NATIONS OFF. ON DRUGS AND CRIME, RESOURCE GUIDE ON
GOOD PRACTICES IN THE INVESTIGATION OF MATCH-FIXING 17 (2016) [hereinafter UNODC GOOD PRAC.],
https://www.unodc.org/documents/corruption/Publications/2016/V1602591RESOURCE_GUIDE_ON_GOOD_PRACTICES_IN_THE_INVESTIGATION_OF_MATCHFIXING.pdf.
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preventive aspects related to match-fixing by making it clear that cheating in a
sports event can per se qualify as a criminal offence.”201 To support national
governments in enacting such legislation, the UNODC and IOC jointly
published model criminal provisions for prosecuting competition
manipulation.202 The model provisions built on legal analysis of fifty-two
national jurisdictions which incriminate match-fixing, twenty-eight of which
have adopted a specific offense or were considering proposals to do so.203 This
number includes the United States on the basis of the federal Sports Bribery Act,
despite its acknowledged deficits.204
From the UNODC-IOC study emerged four key “good practice” elements:205
•
•

•

•

Apply match-fixing offenses to all sports and
competitions.206
Define the offense broadly so that it includes both active and
passive manipulation, for material or non-material gain,
affecting either final outcomes or intermediary components
of contests.
Subject all perpetrators to match-fixing offenses, including
the corruptors (e.g., bribe-givers), the competition
stakeholders (e.g., athletes, coaches, officials), and any
intermediaries, accomplices, or other providers of
assistance to the scheme.
Distinguish match-fixing offenses from betting offenses.

While these four “good practices” makes sense, they notably fail to include a
fifth, elucidated in the previous Part’s critique of the U.S. Sports Bribery Act:
extend culpability to the wide array of methods and tactics that match-fixers are
known to use beyond bribery, including blackmail, extortion, duress, violence,
and lone-wolf schemes.207
As a result of this omission, the UNODC-IOC project has generated
regrettably narrow model provisions:208
201

UNODC-IOC 2016 CRIMINALIZATION STUDY, supra note 187, at 11.
UNODC-IOC MODEL CRIM. CODE, supra note 186.
203
UNODC-IOC 2016 CRIMINALIZATION STUDY, supra note 187, at 23–34 (Argentina, Australia, Brazil,
Bulgaria, People’s Republic of China, Denmark, El Salvador, France, Germany, Greece, India, Italy, Japan,
Republic of Korea, Latvia, Malta, New Zealand, Paraguay, Poland, Portugal, Russian Federation, South
Africa, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States).
204
See 18 U.S.C.A. § 224 (West 1994), and accompanying text in note 8.
205
UNODC-IOC MODEL CRIM. CODE, supra note 186, at 15-18.
206
Broad application of the offense is essential as manipulators may seek to avoid detection by targeting
lower-profile sports competitions (second or third-leagues, friendly matches, less popular sports). UNODCIOC MODEL CRIM. CODE, supra note 186, at 15.
207
See supra Part IV.A.
208
UNODC-IOC MODEL CRIM. CODE, supra note 186, at 19.
202
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1. Any person who, directly or indirectly, promises, offers or
gives any undue advantage to another person, for himself,
herself or for others, with the aim of improperly altering the
result or the course of a sports competition, shall be
punished by _______________.
2. Any person who, directly or indirectly, solicits or accepts
any undue advantage or the promise or the offer thereof, for
himself, herself or for others, with the aim of improperly
altering the result or the course of a sports competition, shall
be punished by ______________
These model provisions incriminate only bribery or the provision of some type
of benefit to a contest participant in exchange for altering the course or outcome
of competition. Prosecutors would not be able to shoehorn into either model
provision a case involving coercion or unilateral behavior by participants
capable of manipulating a contest.
The constricted scope of the UNODC-IOC model provisions is at odds with
the Macolin Convention’s admonitions, in Article 15, that a criminal justice
response to match-fixing must encompass offenses involving coercive acts such
as “extortion, blackmail, poisoning or violence.”209 Defining culpability this
broadly is crucial especially in connection with Article 21 of the Macolin
Convention.210 That article mandates physical protection of whistle-blowers and
witnesses in match-fixing cases, acknowledging that criminal organizations
routinely use “threats, coercion or blackmail towards competition stakeholders
or their support personnel” to thwart detection and evidence gathering.211
Among Macolin’s signatories are a number of nations that have broadly
incriminated game manipulation, regardless of the methods and tactics used.212
Australia is regarded as a world leader in this area because of its specific match209
Macolin Convention, supra note 19, at 9; COUNCIL OF EUR. EXPLANATORY REP., supra note 22, at 21
(offering the “reminder that such conduct is among the methods employed in certain manipulations of sports
competitions”).
210
Macolin Convention, supra note 19, at 10–11.
211
COUNCIL OF EUR. EXPLANATORY REP., supra note 22, at 27–28. The UNODC and IOC may well revisit
their model provisions as a result of their participation in the International Partnership Against Corruption in
Sport (IPACS), an anti-corruption platform they founded along with the Council of Europe, the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development, and UKSport, the United Kingdom’s sports ministry. See About,
IPACS, https://www.ipacs.sport/, (last visited Dec. 12, 2020). In 2019, IPACS established a task force to
promote cooperation between law enforcement/criminal justice authorities and sports organizations, which
will, among other things, take stock of existing anti-bribery legislation and recommend additional tools to
tackle corruption in sports. See INT’L P’SHIP AGAINST CORRUPTION IN SPORT, TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR
TASK FORCE 4 (2019),
https://stillmed.olympic.org/media/Images/Ipacs/PDF/task-force/ToR_Task_Force_4.pdf.
212
UNODC-IOC 2016 CRIMINALIZATION STUDY, supra note 187, at 23–34 (nations studied whose matchfixing crimes go beyond bribery to inculpate other forms of corruption, fraud, and coercion include: Australia,
Brazil, Bulgaria, Greece, Latvia, Portugal, New Zealand, and South Africa).
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fixing legislation.213 After a 2010 corruption incident involving rugby, the
federal government adopted a National Policy on Match-fixing in Sport and
created a special sports integrity unit.214 Although Australia’s federal structure
results in some inconsistency among state/territorial approaches, most have
followed the lead of New South Wales which amended its Crimes Act in 2012
to make it illegal to “engage[] in conduct that corrupts a betting outcome of an
event.”215 Conduct is defined broadly as “an act or an omission to perform an
act,” and therefore can encompass far more than bribery.216
As of 2015, Greek law specifically criminalizes any “intervention” in a
sporting contest to influence its course or outcome.217 Unlike a bribery law, this
provision would cover the conduct alleged in the 2011 Greek soccer matchfixing prosecution that the corrupt actors bombed a referee’s bakery because he
refused to slant his calls to favor one team.218 The Latvia Sports Law defines the
criminal offense of manipulation of sports competition as “any activity that
focuses on violating the unpredictability of the course of the competition or its
results.”219 Portugal imposes criminal liability on any “unsporting behavior” that
may fraudulently alter the results of a sports competition.220
Other nations not signatories to the Macolin Convention have charted a
similar course. New Zealand, expressly responding to uncertainty over whether
existing fraud and anti-corruption offenses would apply to match-fixing,
amended its Crimes Act in 2014 to clarify that criminal “deception” includes
“manipulating . . . sports competitions.”221 Brazil’s criminal code makes it an

213
KIRSTIN HALLMANN ET AL., MATCH-FIXING AND LEGAL SYSTEMS-AN ANALYSIS OF SELECTED LEGAL
SYSTEMS IN EUROPE AND WORLDWIDE WITH SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON DISCIPLINARY AND CRIMINAL
CONSEQUENCES FOR CORRUPTION IN SPORT AND MATCH-FIXING 6 (Oct. 2019),
https://www.playfaircode.at/fileadmin/data/downloads/schulungsmaterial/Report_LegalTeam_Final.pdf.
214
AUSTL. DEP’T OF HEALTH, NATIONAL POLICY ON MATCH-FIXING IN SPORT (June 10, 2011),
https://www1.health.gov.au/internet/main/publishing.nsf/Content/687CADCF3C1BEF8ACA257C310021C
D5C/$File/national_policy_match-fixing.pdf. It is widely acknowledged that Australia’s reforms were a
response to “tortuous” proceedings in a rugby spot-fixing prosecution “based on analogous fraud, attempting
to gain financial advantage through deception or generalised prevention of conspiracy to corrupt/bribe, which
did not always fit the nature of the misconduct.” Jack Anderson, Prevention, Detection and Co-Operation in
Match-Fixing – Part 1 (July 3, 2013), https://www.lawinsport.com/blogs/jack-anderson/item/preventiondetection-and-co-operation-in-match-fixing-part-1.
215
Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) pt 4ACA (“Cheating at gambling”),
https://www.legislation.nsw.gov.au/#/view/act/ 1900/40/whole, archived at https://perma.cc/X5SZ-C7WL.
The relevant amendments were made by the Crimes Amendment (Cheating at Gambling) Act 2012 (NSW),
https://www.legislation.nsw.gov.au/#/view/act/ 2012/64/whole, archived at https://perma.cc/CD3U-W75V;
see HALLMANN ET AL., supra note 213, at 7.
216
Crimes Amendment Act 2012 (NSW) pt 4ACA.
217
HALLMANN ET AL., supra note 213, at 45.
218
Greece Charges 41 over Match-Fixing as Football Scandal Deepens, NEWSWEEK (May 27, 2015),
https://www.newsweek.com/greece-charges-41-over-match-fixing-football-scandal-deepens-327763.
219
Latvia Sports Law, Section 15.1(1) (enacted 2002), http://likumi.lv/ta/en/en/id/68294.
220
UNODC-IOC 2016 CRIMINALIZATION STUDY, supra note 187, at 31.
221
New Zealand Crimes Act 1961 § 240A (enacted 2014); see Law and Order Committee, Commentary
on Crimes (Match-Fixing) Amendment Bill 203-2 (Nov. 2014).
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offense to distort by any means the results of a sports competition. 222 South
Africa criminalizes corrupt activities relating to sporting events including
effectuating “a scheme which constitutes a threat to or undermines the integrity
of any sporting event.”223
After a series of match-fixing incidents involving cricket, Sri Lanka in 2019
became the first South Asian nation to criminalize corruption in sports.224 Titled
“Prevention of Offences Related to Sports,” the Sri Lankan law reaches far,
covering any person who participates in manipulating a sporting contest, by any
means, with a prison term of up to ten years. Competition stakeholders further
risk prosecution for disclosing inside information to betting interests, providing
corrupt figures access to current players, and failing to report a corrupt
approach.225
B. Translating the International Experience into the U.S. Criminal Code
The international approaches to criminalizing match-fixing described above
offer a model for the United States.226 To recap the five essential attributes of
effective criminal laws in this area, match-fixing offenses should:
1. Cover all sports and competitions;
2. Include both active and passive manipulation, whether for
material or non-material gain, and whether affecting final
outcomes or intermediary components of contests;
3. Apply to all perpetrators, including the corruptors, game
participants and personnel, and any intermediaries,
accomplices, or other providers of assistance to a corrupt
scheme;
4. Distinguish match-fixing offenses from betting offenses;
and
5. Extend culpability to the wide array of methods and tactics
that match-fixers are known to use beyond bribery,
222
Law no 10.671 – of 15 May 2003 (as amended by Law no. 13.155 of 4 August 2015); original text
available at: http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_Ato2015-2018/2015/Lei/L13155.htm#art40.
223
Prevention and Combatting of Corrupt Activities Act 12 of 2004, Ch. 15(c) (S. Afr.),
https://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/acts/2004-012.pdf.
224
Andrew Fidel Fernando, Sri Lanka Passes Bill Criminalizing Match-Fixing, ESPN CRICINFO (Nov. 11,
2019), https://www.espncricinfo.com/story/_/id/28057905/sri-lanka-passes-bill-criminalising-match-fixing.
225
Id. Pakistan’s Cricket Board in 2020 asked the government to enact laws similar to Sri Lanka. PCB
Looks at Legislation to Criminalise Match-Fixing Menace, OUTLOOKINDIA.COM (Apr. 15, 2020),
https://www.outlookindia.com/newsscroll/pcb-looks-at-legislation-to-criminalise-matchfixingmenace/1803011.
226
Industry-specific criminal offenses exist elsewhere in the U.S. Code. For example, the Health Care
Fraud Act criminalizes “knowingly and willfully execut[ing] . . . a scheme or artifice . . . to defraud any health
care benefit program.” 18 U.S.C.A. § 1347(a)(1) (West 2010).
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including blackmail, extortion, duress, violence, and lonewolf schemes.227
A new federal criminal offense should accordingly define the actus rei, or overt
acts, and mens rea, or state of mind, that captures these attributes while
providing sufficient notice and warning to sports corrupters of their criminal
liability.228
One proposal that serves well is the Model Sports Wagering Act briefly
advocated in 2018 by the NBA and MLB.229 Its Section 8 on “criminal liability”
imposes up to a $5 million fine and 10-year prison sentence on:
(1)
Whoever . . . (b) knowingly engages in, facilitates, or
conceals conduct that intends to improperly influence a betting
outcome of a sporting event for purposes of financial gain, in
connection with betting or wagering on a sporting event . . . .230
The proposal broadly covers all sporting events, all manner of corrupt conduct,
and all participants in the corruption.231 For example, it would provide a
predicate for charging Tim Donaghy’s lone-wolf conduct in which he bet on
NBA games he officiated.232 The Model Act’s phrasing, particularly the use of
the term “betting outcome,” tracks the New South Wales, Australia Crimes Act
considered an exemplar.233 “Betting outcome” effectively encompasses any
future contingent event on which sports wagers are offered, including during the
course of play and contest results. By imposing severe punishment on offenders,
the Model Act draws on the utilitarian theory that greater consequences must

227

See reports cited supra notes 200–02 and accompanying text.
Elonis v. United States, 575 U.S. 723, 723 (2015) (citing the “general rule” is that a guilty mind is “a
necessary element in the indictment and proof of every crime”) (citation omitted); Rogers v. Tennessee, 532
U.S. 451, 459 (2001) (noting “core due process concepts of notice, foreseeability, and, in particular, the right
to fair warning as those concepts bear on the constitutionality of attaching criminal penalties to what
previously had been innocent conduct”).
229
Model
Sports
Wagering
Act
(Gaming
States),
https://sportshandle.com/wpcontent/uploads/2018/02/Model-Sports-Wagering-Legislation-SportsHandle.pdf (last visited July 31, 2020).
230
Model Sports Wagering Act (Gaming States) § 8(1)(b). The act also criminalizes placing a bet based
on “material nonpublic information.” Id. at § 1(a).
231
Section 8 of the Model Act also empowers sports governing bodies to sue “[a]ny person or gaming
facility who violates subsection (1)(b).” Id. at § 3. This provision echoes one in PASPA that commentators
found most troubling in permitting sports leagues to “obtain injunctions against generally immune state
governments and agents.” I. Nelson Rose & Rebecca Bolin, Game on for Internet Gambling: With Federal
Approval, States Line Up to Place Their Bets, 45 CONN. L. REV. 653, 687 (2012); see also Ryan M.
Rodenberg, Due Process, Private Nondelegation Doctrine, and the Regulation of Sports Betting, 9 UNLV
GAMING L.J. 99, 116 (2019) (arguing that a federal law granting sports leagues the power to veto certain types
of sports wagers would violate the private nondelegation doctrine).
232
See cases and articles cited supra notes 96–113 and accompanying text.
233
See supra notes 212-13 and accompanying text.
228
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ensue where offenses are difficult to detect.234 The breadth of the provision’s
coverage is balanced by the rigorous mental state requirement of knowing
conduct and a specific intent to influence a betting outcome.
Beyond defining the criminal offense, the federal legislative response should
also provide statutory tools to aid detection and prosecution. While prosecutors
already possess subpoena power, legislation can incentivize those with
information to come forward through grants of immunity to whistleblowers and
those compelled to testify.235 Legislation should also expand access to critical
information in the possession of sportsbook operators and sports governing
bodies by imposing mandatory reporting of match-fixing implicated behavior
and betting patterns.236
Equally important given the interstate nature of professional sports, is
multilateral government cooperation between and among federal and state
governments. Even if states maintain their own systems of licensing, regulation,
and taxation of sports books, a hybrid structure could nonetheless establish a
federal mechanism to share information and address integrity issues. To this
point, the Macolin Convention, as well as Australia’s experience, have
established the efficacy of a national integrity of sport unit that expands
networks across governments, sports, the betting industry, and law enforcement
agencies, to aggregate data, develop industry capacity to deter and detect
corruption, and support law enforcement efforts.237
CONCLUSION
The states’ haste to legalize sports gambling after the judicial repeal of
PASPA has been accompanied by a disconcerting myopia about the intensifying
global threat of match-fixing. The legislation that has emerged from most states
reveals a fixation on licensing requirements and revenue capture, combined with
antipathy toward any input or interference from the federal government and
sports governing bodies. This represents a missed opportunity to enact statutory
234
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 989 (1991) (“crimes that are less grave but significantly more
difficult to detect may warrant substantially higher penalties”); see Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness
Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961, 1290 (2001) (noting the desirability of employing higher
punishments where the probability of detection for the offense is low); Oriekhov v. UEFA, CAS 2010/A/2172,
¶ 80 (Court of Arbitration for Sport Jan. 18, 2011) (exhorting “zero-tolerance against all kinds of corruption
and … sanctions sufficient to serve as an effective deterrent to people who might otherwise be tempted through
greed or fear to consider involvement in [match-fixing]), http://arbitration.kiev.ua/uploads/kucher/2172.pdf.
235
See Boles, supra note 141, at 167-68.
236
See Ross et al., supra note 25, at 44; Holden et al., supra note 9, at 470–71.
237
Macolin Convention, supra note 19, at 8; AUSTL. DEP’T OF HEALTH, supra note 214, at § 3.10. The
United Kingdom’s Gambling Commission has similarly established a Sports Betting Integrity Unit that works
closely with the betting industry and sports governing bodies to understand potential threats, in particular
criminal activity directed at events and parties in Great Britain. See Sports Betting Intelligence Unit,
GAMBLING COMM’N, https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/news-action-and-statistics/Match-fixingand-sports-integrity/Sports-Betting-Intelligence-Unit.aspx (last visited Aug. 2, 2020).

BALSAM

34

– ARTICLE 31.1

MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW

12/17/2020 8:47 PM

[Vol. 31:1

predicates and establish strategic partnerships that will preserve the integrity of
the underlying athletic contests and thereby the financial prospects of the sports
betting industry.
Accordingly, this article proposes a measured federal response to the
legitimate critique that “[f]ew countries have been as slow to modernize their
statutes that protect sports integrity as the United States.”238 The proposed
response encompasses defining a federal criminal offense of match-fixing and
supporting the new law with prosecutorial aides and institutional structures that
respect state autonomy while encouraging multilateral government cooperation.
These recommendations are informed by international trial and error in
combatting sports corruption, including demoralizing prosecution efforts to
apply inadequate criminal laws that fail to capture the fixers’ conduct. Appeals
for more effective criminal laws and enforcement tools have dominated the
international conversation about match-fixing, as evidenced in treaties, law
reform commissions, task forces, and a wide range of cross-sector cooperation
efforts.
Widespread legalization of wagering on sports connects the U.S. ever more
firmly to global betting markets and the criminal elements that prey on those
markets. Thus, it is time for the U.S. to join the international movement to equip
law enforcement and industry with the mechanisms to tackle corrupt
manipulation of athletic contests.

238

Holden et al., supra note 10, at 137.

